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ABSTRACT 
In general, economists agree that monetary policy can affect real economic activities at 
least in the short run. However, monetary transmission process is still under debate, 
especially in developing economies. The transition from a central planning economy 
toward a market base economy is allowing monetary policy to exert a greater role in 
Vietnam's economy. Thus, understanding the role of monetary policy and its impact on 
the economy is very important for policymakers. 
Key literature on monetary transmission mechanism is reviewed in Chapter 2. The 
empirical evidence of monetary transmission in developing countries is also analyzed. It 
is found that the transmission process in economies with a fixed exchange rate regime 
and dollarization such as Vietnam is still unexplored. Hence, this thesis could contribute 
to the existing literature by evaluating the impact of monetary policy in Vietnam in the 
period 1999-2006. 
In Chapter 3, a comprehensive analytical review of banking reform, operation of 
monetary policy and dollarization in Vietnam is carried out. A key conclusion is that 
reform in banking sector in past years has generate pressure and allowed banks to operate 
on a more commercial basis and has led State-owned commercial banks to move towards 
profit maximization. Therefore, the analysis of monetary transmission mechanism in 
Vietnam can be implemented. 
Empirical models for investigating different channels of monetary transmission process 
are presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Unlike previous literature on Vietnam, in this 
study the structural vector autoregression (VAR) models allow a differentiation between 
domestic monetary aggregate and foreign currency aggregate in the banking system as 
well as domestic currency interest rate and domestic US dollar interest rate in order to 
analyze the impact of monetary policy in a dollarized economy. The non-recursive VAR 
model is able to better explain the dynamic response of Vietnam's economy in the case 
the central bank changes interest rates of domestic currency and US dollar or the supply 
of domestic monetary aggregate. Results from this model demonstrate that there is no 
evidence of 'liquidity puzzle' and 'price puzzle', which are often found in previous 
studies on monetary transmission. The impulse response of domestic currency interest 
rate after a tightening in domestic US dollar interest rate suggests that the central bank in 
Vietnam is still able to maintain independent monetary policy. Results from recursive 
VAR model of bank lending channel model also indicate that the bank lending activity in 
domestic currency and US dollar did enhance the impacts of changes in monetary policy 
on output and inflation. 
The main policy implication of the study is that in the period 1999-2006 the responses of 
output and inflation after changes in monetary are consistent with theory. The loosening 
monetary policy that central bank in Vietnam has implemented since 1999 did stimulate 
output but it also raised inflation and level of dollarization in several years. Therefore, in 
implementing monetary policy the central bank should not only pay attention to achieve 
annual targets but also need to consider long-term impacts. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in the role played by monetary policy 
in the economy. Modern economics stresses that monetary policy has a significant 
influence on economic behavior, at least in the short term. The monetary transmission 
mechanism can be defined as the process through which monetary policy decisions are 
transmitted into changes in real GDP and inflation (Taylor 1995). In the literature, there 
are many empirical studies of monetary transmission for developed countries but not 
many for developing countries. Even in developed countries, views differ on monetary 
transmission although it has been the subject of many empirical studies over a long 
period (Mishkin 1995). The transmission process in developing countries is still more 
uncertain as different channels of monetary transmission may have different impacts to 
those in developed economies. These differences may arise from the specific framework 
of monetary policy as well as the structure of the financial sector in each country. 
In Vietnam, since the implementation of the renovation policy in 1986, the economy has 
been gradually moving towards a market mechanism. As a result, there have been 
substantial changes in the institutional settings of the financial sector and the 
implementation of monetary policy. Between 1997 and 2002, the slowdown in foreign 
direct investment and the contagion effect of the Asian Financial Crisis made Vietnam's 
economy more dependent on its own monetary policy, and banking system in boosting 
GDP growth (Kovsted et al, 2005). Monetary policy has exerted a greater role in the 
economy and the banking system has become more effective in the intermediation of 
financial resources. However, how important monetary policy is for Vietnam is still 
under debate. Previous studies, such as Pham and Vo (2005) on monetary transmission 
between 1999 and 2004 find that the impact of monetary policy seems to be inconsistent 
with theory. The State Bank of Vietnam (2004) also claims that the increase in inflation 
does not stem only from the expansionary monetary policy implemented in previous 
years to promote growth, but also from other factors, for example, the compulsory 
increases in wages and pensions. However, Baker et al (2006) argues that monetary 
factors appear to have become an important determinant of inflation in recent years 
because the liberalization in price controls could have increased the responsiveness of 
domestic prices to changes in monetary policy. Therefore, an empirical study on the 
monetary transmission mechanism in Vietnam would extend understanding of this 
process in the context of a developing country and help the State Bank of Vietnam (the 
central bank) in formulating appropriate monetary policy. 
The thesis reviews the existing literature and empirical studies on the monetary 
transmission mechanism in developing countries, examines the necessary conditions for 
analyzing this issue in Vietnam, and investigates different structural vector autoregressive 
models for identifying the monetary transmission process in the case of Vietnam. 
1.2 Purpose, scope and contribution of the thesis 
Understanding monetary transmission is useful for managing the economy. Firstly, 
through the monetary transmission mechanism we can know which monetary aggregates 
(Ml, M2, broad money) are impacted by monetary policy. This would help central banks 
in choosing appropriate targets in their operations. Secondly, a better understanding of 
the monetary transmission mechanism helps the central bank assess the movements in 
monetary aggregates more precisely. Both of the above would improve our understanding 
of the linkage between the financial and real sectors in the economy. 
Vietnam is in a transitional process from a central planning economy towards a market 
based economy. In implementing monetary policy, the central bank in Vietnam has to 
deal with the dollarisation issue, the pegged exchange rate, and capital control. In the 
literature, there are only some studies on monetary transmission in transitional and 
dollarized economies (Kamin et al 1998). Therefore, a study on the monetary 
transmission process in Vietnam would be useful. This thesis addresses the question: 
'How effective was monetary policy for economic management in Vietnam in the period 
1999-2006?'. The period 1999-2006 is chosen because in that time Vietnam experienced 
numerous banking reforms. It will be shown that the necessary conditions for the 
implementation of effective monetary policy were established. The dollarisation issue 
may also affect the monetary transmission process in Vietnam's economy. Thus, 
dollarisation also needs to be addressed in the model of monetary transmission. The 
structural vector autoregressive models are used to analyse the different effects of 
monetary transmission process. Then conclusions and recommendations can be drawn for 
Vietnam in implementing monetary policy. 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
The organization of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 is a review of the theories of 
monetary transmission and the empirical applications to developing countries. Chapter 3 
examines the preconditions for the banking sector to operate on a commercial basis in 
Vietnam during 1999-2006. Specifically, Chapter 3 analyzes the independence of the 
State Bank of Vietnam in implementing monetary policy, reviews the deregulation 
process in the banking sector, and discusses the impact of dollarisation on monetary 
policy. Chapter 4 investigates the impact of monetary policy on Vietnam's economy by 
employing a recursive structural vector autoregression model and then by using a non-
recursive structural vector autoregression model. In the recursive model the interactions 
between current values of variables in the vector autoregression model are assumed to be 
one-way only following the ordering of variables in the model. However, in the non-
recursive model the interactions between current values of variables in the model do not 
depend on the ordering of variables. Chapter 5 uses recursive structural vector 
autoregression model to examine the impact of monetary transmission through bank 
lending channel. Chapter 6 concludes the findings and offers some policy 
recommendations. 
CHAPTER 2 MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM -
REVIEW OF THE KEY LITERATURE 
2.1 Main theoretical hypotheses 
Four main hypotheses of transmission of monetary policy have been identified in the 
literature (Mishkin 1995). 
Figure 2.1 Channels of monetary transmission mechanism 
Source: Pham T.H., Vo T.T., 2005, CIEM. 
The first is the conventional interest rate channel in the IS-LM framework originally 
introduced by Keynes in 1930s (Mankiw et al 1999) that focuses on direct interest rate 
effects. In this conventional model of monetary transmission, a shift in monetary policy 
leads to a change in the money supply. For a given money demand the change in money 
supply leads to changes in interest rates in the money market. Changes in bank loan rates 
would affect investment decisions and changes in deposit rates would affect saving 
decisions. The transmission of monetary policy through the interest rate channel is 
summarized in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 Interest rate channel 
Source: Pham T.H., Vo T.T., 2005, CIEM and author. 
A key issue in this hypothesis is how the change in the interest rate most directly under 
the central bank's control (usually the overnight rate) affects other short-term rates and 
spreads to long-term rates, which are relevant to investment decisions. This depends on 
the development of the financial market and the expectation of inflation. 
Furthermore, in this framework, the present value of assets is inversely related to the real 
interest rate. Changes in interest rates not only alter the marginal cost of borrowing but 
also lead to changes in the average interest rate, which also have cash flow effects on 
borrowers and lenders. Taylor (1995) argues that the distinction between real and 
nominal interest rates is important in differentiating between the effects of marginal and 
average interest rate. He stresses that it is the marginal cost of borrowing that determines 
saving and investment decisions, and that the marginal cost is affected by the real interest 
rate. Changes in interest rate also lead to changes to average cost of outstanding loans and 
deposits. Thus, the income and cash flow of lenders and borrowers will be affected. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) note another aspect of the transmission of monetary policy 
through the interest rate channel. A rise in the nominal interest rate that reflects a higher 
inflationary expectation could mean that the real rate remains constant and would not 
change the current marginal cost of borrowing. However, the rise in the nominal interest 
rate will alter the cash-flow and balance-sheet positions of borrowers because of changes 
in the average interest rate. Thus, according to them, a shift in monetary policy would 
lead to changes in output and inflation. 
The second channel is the impact of monetary policy through changes in asset prices, 
such as bonds, share and real estate prices, which are described in Figure 2.3. Changes in 
interest rates affect the prices of assets such as bonds, shares and real estate in the 
economy. First, the indirect effect of monetary policy on an economy can be transmitted 
through the life cycle model of consumption developed by Modigliani (1986). In this 
model, the hypothesis is that consumer spending is determined by their lifetime 
resources. Modigliani (1986) argues that a rise in nominal interest rates reduces the value 
of household assets such as stocks, fixed rate bonds and real estate, thus decreasing 
household wealth. As a result households revise their income expectations and hence 
reduce their consumption. Similarly, changes in the value of assets held by firms due to 
monetary action would alter the firm's investment plan. Changes in consumption and 
investment lead to changes in output and inflation. 
Figure 2.3 Asset price channel 
Source: Pham T.H., Vo T.T., 2005, CIEM. 
Second, another way that asset price changes induced by monetary policy can affect 
output is described by Tobin's q theory of investment (Tobin 1969). This suggests that if 
a central bank loosens its monetary policy, share prices may rise. Thus the market price 
of firms could be higher than the replacement cost of capital. This will lower the effective 
cost of capital as the newly issued shares can have a higher price relative to the cost of 
the real equipment and plant. Therefore, even if the interest rates react little to policy 
easing, monetary policy can still affect the cost of capital and investment spending. 
The third hypothesis is the exchange rate channel, which is closely related to the 
exchange rate regime and capital control. Taylor (1995) explains that under a flexible 
exchange rate regime and no capital control, the exchange rate effects involve interest 
rate effects . This happens when the domestic interest rate rises after monetary tightening 
and domestic currency deposits become more attractive compared with deposits 
denominated in foreign currencies. This leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate, and at least initially the real exchange rate. This affects foreign trade and causes a 
fall in net exports and the level of aggregate output. Figure 4 describes the effect of 
monetary policy in the case of flexible exchange rate regimes and free transfer of capital 
between domestic and foreign markets. 
Figure 2.4 Exchange rate channel with flexible exchange rate regime 
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Source: Pham T.H., Vo T.T., 2005, CIEM. 
Changes in exchange rates can also affect output and inflation through other processes. 
First is the exchange rate pass-through effect - changes in the domestic prices resulting 
from variations in the nominal exchange rate. Second is the balance sheet effect, which 
may be more relevant to developing countries. Kamin et al (1998) indicate that in many 
developing countries, firms and households have debts denominated in foreign 
currencies. They also assert that if the debt is not fully offset by foreign currency 
revenues or is hedged in the foreign exchange market, changes in the exchange rate will 
affect the net worth of firms and households. This leads to changes in borrowing and 
spending by these firms and households. 
However, Hallwood and Macdonald (2000) maintain that under a fixed exchange rate 
regime and no capital control, monetary policy does not have any effect on output 
through the exchange rate channel. On the other hand, under a fixed exchange rate regime 
and capital control, the domestic interest rate may deviate from the international level. 
Therefore, monetary policy may be able to affect the real exchange rate and the traded 
goods sector. As a result, prices and output are affected. Figure 2.5 explains the impact of 
changes in monetary policy in an economy which follows the fixed exchange rate regime 
or managed exchange rate regime and maintains the capital control. 
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Figure 2.5 Exchange rate channel with fixed or managed exchange rate regime 
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Source: Pham T.H., Vo T.T., 2005, CIEM. 
The final hypothesis is the credit channel, which focuses on the role of the banking 
system in providing credit to the economy. Meltzer (1995) argues that the development of 
, t 
financial markets in recent decades may have reduced the importance of the credit 
channel. However, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) demonstrate that banks still play an 
important role in the credit market even in developed countries where financial markets 
are well developed. 
Studies by Kashyap et al (1993), on the US, and Kim (1999) on Korea confirm the 
existence of the credit channel in these developed economies. The credit channel assumes 
that firms and households depend significantly on external borrowing. This can be 
divided into the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel. Figure 2.6 describes 
transmission of changes in monetary policy to changes in output and prices through the 
credit channel. 
11 
Figure 2.6 Credit channel 
Source: Pham T.H., Vo T.T., 2005, CIEM. 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) establish that the main assumption underlying the balance 
sheet channel hypothesis is that the price borrowers pay for their debt depends on their 
net worth used as collateral. The higher the net worth, the lower the price borrowers have 
to pay for their borrowing. Furthermore, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) point out that 
monetary policy may affect the availability of credit through its effects on the value of 
assets not only of borrowers but also of lenders. First, the value of the collateral for bank 
loans may be affected by changes in asset prices. Therefore, the access of borrowers to 
bank credit could be affected. Second, a bank may invest part of its assets in equity or 
real estate. The decline in asset prices could lower the capital/asset ratio of the bank and 
pressure it to decrease the supply of credit. Thus, the balance sheet channel explains the 
distributional effects of monetary policy on both lenders and borrowers while the 
conventional view does not. 
12 
The bank lending channel was first proposed by Roosa (Roosa 1951, cited in Kuttner and 
Mosser 2002:18). The bank lending channel hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
there is a class of borrowers, usually small and medium enterprises, who are significantly 
dependent on bank loans. The problem of asymmetric information is serious for this class 
of borrowers. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argue that whereas large firms can directly 
access the credit market through bond and stock issues without going through banks, 
small and less reputable firms have poor access to the credit market. Thus, a reduction in 
bank loans will make the small and medium sized borrowers incur costs associated with 
finding new lenders or reduce production and employment. Hence, output and prices in 
the economy are likely to be affected. 
Although most of the literature on the credit channel concentrates on investment by firms, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) suggest that it should be applied to household spending as 
well. 
13 
2.2 Empirical evidence of monetary transmission in developing countries 
In general, empirical studies on developing countries support the existence of all four 
hypotheses. However, due to the specific conditions of each country the relative 
importance of each hypothesis is different. Kamin et al (1998) stress that analyzing the 
different channels of transmission shows that changes in monetary policy affect the real 
economy in two stages. The first is the transmission from the monetary instrument 
directly under the central bank's control (money supply, short-term interest rates, and 
reserve requirements) to financial variables such as: deposit rates, loan rates, exchange 
rate, and asset prices. The second stage of the transmission process is from those financial 
variables to spending decisions of households and firms. The structure of the financial 
system and current conditions in developing countries also play an important role in the 
transmission process. 
2.2.1 Interest rate channel 
Kamin et al (1998) suggest that most literature on monetary transmission points to the 
effectiveness of interest rate channel being dependent on the extent and the speed of 
change in the interest rate directly under the central bank's control (usually the overnight 
inter-bank rate). This then affects all short-term interest rates. In addition, they agree it is 
important to note how changes in short-term rates spread to all types of interest rates, in 
particular the long-term interest rates which are most relevant to investment and spending 
decisions. According to them six factors influence the interest rate channel. 
First is the competitiveness within the banking sector. Kamin et al (1998) argue that 
14 
monetary policy plays its role effectively when changes in the inter-bank interest rate lead 
quickly to changes in deposit and lending rates. The responsiveness of deposit and 
lending rates depends on the degree of competition in the banking sector. When there are 
many banks and market conditions are competitive, changes in the cost of funds are likely 
to rapidly affect loan and deposit rates. However, in developing countries, the banking 
sector is usually concentrated. Thus oligopolistic pricing may occur. Some large banks 
may determine the interest levels in the market; other smaller banks are under pressure to 
follow those levels. 
An empirical study by Iljas (1998) on Indonesia confirms this practice. Furthermore, the 
response of loan and deposit rates to changes in the money market may be sluggish and 
asymmetric. Sirivedhin (1998) and Carrasquilla (1998) both show that banks tend to 
adjust lending rates less frequently than deposit rates in Thailand and Columbia. Thus, 
the competition level may be different between the deposit market and the lending 
market. In addition, Podpiera's (2006) study of China's state-owned commercial banks 
confirms that in developing countries the presence of state-owned or state-subsidized 
banks under little pressure to maximize profits could diminish the responsiveness of loan 
and deposit rates to changes in monetary policy. 
Second, the effectiveness of the interest rate channel is related to access to the domestic 
informal market by firms and households. The interest rates on deposits and loans set by 
the banking sector may also depend on how firms and households access alternative 
domestic funding sources. Kamin et al (1998) point out that in many developing 
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countries the informal mari<et plays an important role. They also claim that where the 
formal banking sector and informal markets are highly segregated, monetary policy only 
has a limited impact on the informal market. The transmission of monetary policy is more 
effective when formal and informal markets are integrated to some degree. Rocha (1998) 
finds that tighter monetary policy, which raises bank deposits, may encourage households 
to shift their savings from the informal market to the formal market As a result funds 
available in the informal market are reduced. Thus activity of sectors dependent on 
informal market credit will be affected. Haughton (2000) finds that (based on data 
obtained from Vietnam's living standards measurement surveys of 1992-3 and 1997-8) 
Vietnamese households were also acting as financial intermediaries. These surveys show 
that about half of the households were borrowers and 14 per cent were lenders. In 
addition, nearly half of the lenders had borrowed funds at an average rate of 1.3 per cent 
per month and were lending at an average rate of 2.6 per cent per month. 
Third, the development of the capital market has an impact on the interest rate channel. 
Kamin et al (1998) argue that the depth of money and capital markets can also have an 
important effect on the movement of interest rates. They reason that the capital market 
provides an alternative source of funds to firms and households besides the banking 
system. If the capital market is developed, movement in the interest rates in this market 
and money market rates may closely relate to each other. In contrast, Klein (1998) 
suggests that a thin or uncompetitive capital market can cause major volatility in the 
money market interest rates. Banks may not adjust their loan and deposit rates in response 
to movements in the money market rates if these rates are highly variable. As capital 
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market in many developing countries remains in the early stages of development, its 
impact on the credit channel may be limited. 
Fourth, the initial financial conditions of firms and households also affect the 
transmission of monetary policy. Kamin et al (1998) observe that in some developing 
countries where financial intermediation is underdeveloped, investment is usually 
financed by internal sources (such as personal savings and retained earnings). They claim 
that the impact of changes in monetary policy on spending and investment decisions may 
be constrained. For example, investment by firms in India was mostly from internal 
sources (Kamin et al, 1998). However, research on Thailand by Sirivedhin (1998) 
indicates that in a developing economy where financial intermediation of banks is well 
established, the financial sector's ability and efficiency to channel savings to borrowers 
could help to increase the sensitivity of spending and investment decisions by firms and 
households to changes in monetary policy. 
The changes in monetary policy may affect sectors in the economy differently due to the 
pattern of financing. Kamin et al (1998) assert that sectors such as construction or 
mining, which have high requirements for fixed capital, are likely to be dependent on 
bank credit. Thus, those sectors are sensitive to monetary conditions. 
Fifth, the time-length of financial contracts between borrowers and lenders is a factor that 
affects the interest rate channel. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that changes in 
monetary policy could affect economic activity by altering the cash-flow position of 
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borrowers. They reason that this depends not only on the magnitude to which changes in 
poHcy-induced interest rates lead to changes in new deposit and lending rates, but also on 
how quickly changes in the new rates lead to changes in average rates. Thus the maturity 
of financial contracts plays a pivotal role here. The shorter the maturity, the more 
frequently will deposits and loans be renewed at new interest rates. Thus the average rates 
earned by depositors and paid by borrowers will change quickly. The time-length of the 
financial contracts may reflect the degree of inflationary expectation in the economy. 
Thus, the higher the inflationary expectations, the shorter the time-length of flnancial 
contracts. 
Kamin et al (1998) consider that another factor determining the changes in average rates 
is the use of deposits and loans with adjustable interest rates. The average rates will be 
changed in response to the adjustment of contractual interest rates. Mohan (2006) 
suggests that in India the rigidity of interest rates in the market, due to the existence of 
administered interest rates in certain segment of banking sector, reduces the effectiveness 
of monetary transmission. 
Finally, the access of domestic firms to offshore borrowing also affects monetary 
transmission through the interest rate channel. Garnaut (1998a) shows external borrowing 
has become an important source of funds for many developing countries in Asia. This 
allows firms to reduce their dependence on the domestic credit market and lessens the 
impact of domestic monetary policy on aggregate demand. As an example, Sirivedhin 
(1998) finds external financing of Thai enterprises grew from 16 per cent of GDP in 1989 
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to 27 per cent in 1995. 
A monetary tightening that raises domestic lending rates may cause firms to switch to 
offshore borrowing if the differential between the domestic and foreign interest rates is 
larger than the expected change in the exchange rate. Thus, the effectiveness of domestic 
monetary policy is reduced. Carrasquilla (1998) and Sirivedhin (1998) both find that only 
large firms could access offshore markets in studies on Columbia and Thailand 
respectively. Therefore the impact of monetary tightening will fail on small firms and 
households. As a result, the transmission of monetary tightening may become more 
uncertain because small firms are usually vulnerable to credit rationing and face financial 
constraints. 
Kamin et a/ (1998) conclude that most empirical studies on developing countries find that 
the interest rate channel is an important channel to transmit money shocks to the 
economy because of its direct effects on participants in the economy. Frankel (1999) 
indicates that in countries which adopt a currency board, such as Argentina and Hong 
Kong, the monetary authority does not have an independent monetary policy. Thus, in 
this case, the importance of the interest rate channel depends on changes in monetary 
policy in the anchor currency. 
2.2.2 Exchange rate channel 
How capital flows are managed is closely related to the transmission of monetary policy 
through the exchange rate channel. Kamin et al (1998) note that the exchange rate 
19 
channel plays an important role in the transmission process in developing countries 
because in those countries the exchange rate could be considered the most important 
"asset price" affected by monetary policy. In the absence of capital controls, in theory the 
effectiveness of domestic monetary policy is determined by the exchange rate regime and 
the degree of substitution between domestic and foreign assets. 
Hall wood and Macdonald (2000) explain that in an economy with a fixed exchange rate 
regime plus domestic and foreign assets being perfect substitutes, any changes in 
monetary policy could be offset by the fluctuation in capital flows. Thus domestic 
monetary conditions remain unchanged. In other words, the central bank loses its 
monetary independence in this case. 
Only when capital control is used or the degree of substitution between domestic and 
foreign assets is limited, does the central bank have more scope to adjust domestic 
interest rates independently of foreign interest rates. However, the central bank's ability 
to sterilize the capital flows is pivotal in this case. Warr (1998) shows that the incomplete 
sterilization by the Bank of Thailand (the central bank) and the liberalization of capital 
control were major causes of the financial crisis in this country in late 1990. Goodfriend 
and Prasad (2006) also find that China, with strict capital controls, experienced difficulty 
in sterilization of capital inflows in order to maintain a fixed exchange rate with the US 
dollar. Thus, since August 2006, China has gradually allowed the exchange rate to 
appreciate to control capital inflows. However, McCauley (2006) notes that in Malaysia, 
although capital controls were porous, they were sufficient to allow Malaysia to have an 
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independent monetary policy after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-8. 
Empirical studies on the exchange rate channel can be divided into two areas: open 
economies with a flexible exchange rate and open economies with a fixed exchange rate 
(Hallwood and Macdonald 2000). In the latter, the exchange rate channel does not have 
any role in the transmission process. However, as Warr (1998) indicates, the real 
exchange rate does have a role in affecting spending and investment decisions in the 
economy through its effect on the traded goods sector. 
The dollarization issue also needs to be considered in analyzing the exchange rate 
channel. Reinhart et al (2003) show that many developing countries have experienced the 
use of foreign currency in parallel with their domestic currency as a unit of account, a 
store of value, a means of transaction, or all three. The reason is usually the instability in 
the economic and political circumstances in those countries. Rennhack and Nozaki 
(2006) remark that the transmission of monetary policy in a dollarized economy is 
complex because assets can be denominated in the domestic currency or foreign currency 
and assets can be local or foreign. Thus the transmission of monetary policy will depend 
not only on substitution between assets denominated in the domestic currency and foreign 
currency in the local market but also substitution between assets denominated in the 
foreign currency in the local and foreign markets. For example, assets in domestic 
currency and foreign currency in the local market are close substitutes but assets in 
foreign currency in the local market and foreign market are not close substitutes (due to 
restrictions on capital flows or on ownership). Assuming the exchange rate is fixed; a 
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tightening of monetary policy will lead to an increase in interest rates of the domestic 
currency and may induce borrowers to switch to foreign currency loans in the domestic 
market. Hence the interest rates of foreign currency loans and deposits increase. 
Therefore, in this case monetary policy is effective. 
However, Kamin et al (1998) reason that when foreign currency assets in the local market 
and foreign market are highly substitutable, the transmission of monetary policy will be 
similar to that of a non-dollarized economy with no capital control, except that access to 
foreign currency loans might be more prevalent in a dollarised economy than in a non-
dollarized one. 
Misaico (2001) and Reinhart et al (2003) provide some preliminary results on monetary 
transmission in dollarized economies. They conclude that the channel of transmission is 
closely linked to the degree of dollarization, the exchange rate regime and regulations on 
capital flows in each country. 
2.2.3 Asset price channel 
Kamin et al (1998) suggest that in developing countries where the financial markets for 
bonds and equities are under-developed, the transmission of monetary policy through the 
asset price channel is difficuh to measure. However, Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) 
in an empirical study of Thailand - a country where financial markets are well established 
- finds evidence of an asset price channel in the transmission process. 
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2.2.4 Credit channel 
Interest rate control is also a factor that should be accounted for when analyzing the credit 
channel in developing economies. Kamin et al (1998) note that the central banks in some 
developing countries impose limits on deposit and lending rates. The limits placed on 
interest rates safeguard commercial banks' profitability but reduce competition in the 
market. Furthermore, these restrictions on interest rates may influence the transmission of 
monetary policy because commercial banks cannot adjust their rates to balance the 
demand and supply of credit or to compensate for different levels of risk. Kwok (2006) 
shows that in China, the central bank has imposed caps on various deposit rates and 
floors on different lending rates, guaranteeing a large interest rate spread. The cap on the 
benchmark one-year deposit rate, for instance, is 2.52 per cent, while the floor for the 
one-year lending rate is slightly over 6 per cent, allowing banks and those institutions that 
lend money a 3.5 per cent interest spread. Mohan (2006) confirms that administered 
interest rates are applied to savings in India. Thus, competition between banks is 
restricted to some extent. 
Another factor that affects the credit channel is the existence of bank lending limits. In 
some developing countries the central banks impose direct targets or exert influence on 
bank lending. This policy serves many purposes. Kamin et al (1998) indicate that in 
Brazil, a credit ceiling was imposed in 1995 in order to reduce the rapid growth of credit 
and inflation, whereas in other countries (China, Malaysia and Indonesia) there are 
lending guidelines to support some privileged sectors. Thus, businesses which do not 
23 
belong to the privileged sector may have limited access to bank credit and have to rely 
more on the informal financial market. McCauley (2006) also shows that limits on the 
amount of borrowings and levels of interest rates have been applied to the credit card 
sector in Thailand due to excessive expansion of the credit card market in recent years. 
In contrast to the asset price channel, Kamin et al (1998) conclude that most empirical 
studies on developing economies find evidence of the credit channel because businesses 
are still heavily dependent on the banking system. 
In general, empirical studies on the transmission of monetary policy in developing 
countries show some unresolved issues. Kamin et al (1998) argue that the first issue is 
how the central banks measure the tightness of monetary conditions in developing 
economies. This relates to whether the central banks follow a monetary targeting policy 
or interest rate targeting policy. Because many factors affect the channels of transmission 
in developing economies, the interpretation of monetary stance is difficult. 
The second issue is the effect of monetary policy in highly inflationary economies. Lopez 
(1998) and Eyzaguirre (1998) stress that when inflation is high and unstable, the 
importance of the different channels may be reduced because the real interest rate 
becomes unstable, maturity of financial instruments decreases and the degree of 
dollarization in the economy could increase. 
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The final unresolved issue is the transmission of monetary policy in economies with a 
fixed exchange rate regime and dollarization. Reinhart et al (2003) stress that many 
countries have relied on the fixed exchange rate as a less costly way to control inflation. 
However, this policy may lead to the loss of monetary independence. Since the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the transmission of monetary policy in developing countries which 
experienced the crisis has been given more emphasis (Gamaut 1998b). However, the 
transmission mechanism in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime, capital control 
and dollarization such as Vietnam is still unexplored. The current research on Vietnam 
fills this gap in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 3 BANKING REFORM AND MONETARY POLICY IN VIETNAM 
3.1 Independence of the central bank and the monetary transmission mechanism 
Central bank independence refers to the freedom of monetary policy makers from direct 
political or governmental influence in the conduct of policy (Kovsted 2005). Walsh 
(2003) finds that empirical studies on developed economies using various indices have 
shown that central bank independence is negatively correlated with the average inflation 
rates but has no correlation with GDP growth. However, there are different levels of 
central bank independence even in developed economies. Although there are some 
questions on the causality of these correlations, these findings have encouraged 
developing countries which have experienced high inflation, to reform their central banks 
in order to achieve better price stability. Sturm and de Haan (2001) conclude that 
although empirical results on the relationship between central bank independence and 
inflation in developing countries are mixed, it is widely believed that a high level of 
central bank independence and an explicit mandate for the central bank to restrain 
inflation are important institutional devices to maintain price stability. The control of 
inflation is usually one of the major objectives of monetary policy in most countries. 
Central bank independence enhances the credibility of it 's commitment to price stability. 
McDonough (2002) indicates that the credibility of a central bank's commitment to price 
stability is also important because a credible central bank may be more effective in 
conducting stabilization policy. He argues that a stimulative monetary policy in response 
to a slowdown in aggregate demand would be less likely to undermine a central bank's 
commitment to price stability when the central bank is independent. Thus the 
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effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism is partly related to the 
independence of the centra! bank. 
Since the late 1980s Vietnam's economy had gradually shifted to a market-oriented one 
and at the same time, many steps were taken towards reforming the Vietnamese banking 
sector. In 1988 Decree No.53/ND was issued to establish the state-owned, specialized 
commercial banks that were separate from the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV). This decree 
was the first step toward transforming the one-tier banking system into a two-tier system. 
In 1990 the issuance of two Ordinances on banking (the 'Ordinance of the State Bank of 
Vietnam' and the 'Ordinance on Banks, Credit Cooperatives and Finance Companies ') 
confirmed the transformation into a two-tier banking system. For the first time the 
objectives, duties and operational purposes of each tier of the banking system were 
stipulated. The State Bank of Vietnam was officially authorized to assume the traditional 
functions of a central bank such as the conduct of monetary policy and supervision of the 
financial system. 
In 1998 the role of the SBV was enhanced by the Law on the State Bank of Vietnam. 
Unlike some other developing countries (Thailand for example) where the central banks 
could operate at their discretion and be independent of the government, the Law on the 
SBV stipulates that the SBV is a body which belongs to the government. According to 
the Law on the SBV the conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam can be summarized as 
follows. First, every year the SBV submits a proposal for monetary policy to the 
government. The government may then submit a modified proposal for monetary policy 
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to the National Assembly for discussion and approval. Based on the targets the National 
Assembly has approved on the GDP growth rate, inflation rate, the amount of new money 
issuance, credit growth and so on, the government and the SBV are allowed to operate in 
order to achieve those targets. Thus, the SBV is not the only one to make decisions 
concerning monetary policy. This raises the issue of the comparison between the 
independence of the SBV and central banks in some other developing countries. 
To evaluate the different aspects of the SBV's independence, Kovsted et al (2005) 
following Cukierman (1992) identify three aspects: (i) legal independence; (ii) political 
independence and (iii) operational independence. Legal independence is defined as the 
degree of independence stipulated in the laws about the SBV. They find that the level of 
legal independence of the SBV, although lower than that of OECD countries, is on par 
with or exceeds that observed in the region and other developing countries. 
Kovsted et al (2005) define political independence as the assessment of actual practice of 
the laws on the SBV under the influences of external factors. Cukierman (1992) proposes 
using the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors, which is the average number of 
changes of central bank governors per year, as a proxy for central bank political 
independence. He argued that a higher turnover rate of central bank governors may 
indicate a lower level of central bank political independence. Table 3.1 shows the results 
of Kovsted et al's (2005) comparison of political independence between central banks in 
Vietnam and some other developing countries in the region. 
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Table 3.1 T u r n o v e r ra te of cen t ra l b a n k governors , 1980-98 (annual average) 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
1980-89 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.33 
1990-98 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.50 
Source: Kovsted et al, 2005, From Monobank to Commercial Banking, NIAS 
They conclude that the level of political independence of the SBV has fallen over the two 
periods and is low in comparison with some other countries in the region. However, their 
calculation seems to be incorrect for the period 1990-8. In this period the TOR of central 
bank governors in Vietnam was 0.33 not 0.50. Therefore, the level of political 
independence did not fall in the period 1990-8 in comparison with period the 1980-9 as 
Kovsted et al (2005) concluded. 
In fact the TOR of central bank governors in Vietnam since 1990, when the SBV was 
established as a central bank, is similar to other countries in the region. Table 3.2 shows 
the TOR of central bank governors for Vietnam and some selected countries in the period 
1990-2005. It can be seen that in this period the level of political independence of the 
SBV as measured by the TOR of central bank governors is on a par with that of central 
banks in other countries in the region. 
Table 3.2 T u r n o v e r ra te of centra l b a n k governors , 1990-2005 (annual average) 
Period Philippines Malaysia Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
1990-2005 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.38 0.25 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
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Operational independence is defined by Kovsted et al (2005) as the ability of the central 
bank's staff to design and implement policies and strategies. In assessing operational 
independence, they argued that the SBV appears to be restricted by an overstaffmg 
structure and limited capability of internal training institutions. However, those 
assessments need to be treated with caution for several reasons. First, as Vietnam is a 
cash-based economy, a large ratio of staff at the SBV is needed to print and distribute the 
currency. Second, the quantity and quality of the SBV staff are also enriched by 
universities outside the SBV which provide better services than the SBV's internal 
training institutions (WB 2002). Besides, the SBV implemented several technical 
assistance projects for capacity building with World Bank, IMF, ADB. The increasing 
usage of open market operations since 2002 suggests that operational capability of the 
SBV has been improved (SBV 2005). Kovsted et al (2005) argue that the SBV cannot 
effectively develop and execute national monetary policies. However, it should be noted 
that their conclusion is based on analyzing Vietnam's banking sector before 2002. Thus, 
considering new evidence on political independence as measured by TOR of governor in 
period 1990 - 2005 and operational independence of the SBV, it could be said that SBV 
independence has been equal to other countries in the region in recent years. Hence, it is 
possible to analyze the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism in Vietnam 
on a similar basis to other countries. 
Furthermore, Goodman (1991) and Posen (1994) argue that developing countries could 
opt for an indirect approach to obtain central bank independence by developing private 
banks rather than the direct approach of creating a legally and politically independent 
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central bank. They propose that developing countries could create and strengthen a 
domestic constituency for low inflation. Private banks, due to their maturity mismatch of 
assets and liabilities and the non-marketable nature of their assets, are vulnerable to high 
inflation. Thus, private banks would support monetary policy that focuses on an objective 
of low inflation. Thus Goodman (1991) and Posen (1994) reason that the establishment of 
private banks will lead to a more independent central bank through higher outside 
pressure for low inflation. It seems that Vietnam has followed this approach. In Vietnam 
private banks group could consist of all other banks and credit institutions besides the 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). Table 3 shows the structure of the banking 
sector in the period 1994-2006. 
Table 3.3 Structure of credit institutions in Vietnam 
1994 2001 2006 
SOCBs 6 6 
Joint-stock banks' 46 45 35 
Joint-venture banks 3 4 6 
Foreign bank branches 9 26 37 
Financial companies 2 2 7 
People Credit Funds 219 na 905 
balance of payments, Thailand Development Research Institute and data provided by the SBV web site). 
' Joint-stock banks are banks owned by a group of individuals, enterprises and organisations (They could 
also called private banks). Total foreign ownership in a joint-stock bank is allowed at maximum of 30 per 
cent of its chartered capital. 
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Financial liberalization in this period has made the banking sector more diverse. The 
number of foreign bank branches has increased noticeably. The number of joint-stock 
banks has decreased due to the closure and merger of some insolvent banks in this period 
(NIAS 2002). However, in terms of banking assets, the share of private banks has 
increased from 10 per cent in 1996 to nearly 22 per cent in 2006 and the share of SOCBs 
decreased from nearly 80 per cent to 68 per cent in the same period (SBV 2006). The 
share of SOCBs in the credit market has been reduced from nearly 82 per cent in 1998 to 
63.5 per cent in 2006^. With implementation of the US-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement 
and Vietnam's recent WTO membership, it is likely that private banks with foreign 
capital could play a larger role in the Vietnamese economy. The current relatively high 
levels of inflation imply that anti-inflation, as suggested by Posen (1994), is likely to 
become a concern for private banks. The growing private bank sector would generate 
pressure on the SBV to maintain a low inflation objective. 
In conclusion, although the independence of the SBV may not be comparable with the 
situation in developed countries, it is arguably similar to other developing countries in the 
region. Thus, the SBV plays an important role in Vietnam's economy. Therefore, analysis 
of the monetary transmission mechanism is useful in assessing how the SBV implements 
monetary policy to achieve goals in relation to output and inflation. 
• Author's calculations. 
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3.2 Objectives, targets and strategies of monetary policy in Vietnam 
The SBV, as a body belonging to the government, is responsible for executing the annual 
monetary policy approved by National Assembly. The objectives of monetary policy are 
generally defined as follows: to support the economic growth, to contain inflation and to 
enhance the purchasing power of the Vietnamese dong (SBV 2005). However, Camen 
(2006) argues that the ultimate target for government and the SBV is the target for 
economic growth. Information on targets^ and solutions of monetary policy are presented 
in the Annual Reports, Circulars of the Governor of SBV and sometimes media 
interviews'^. Generally the monetary policy of the SBV consists of following targets: 
First is the target for the growth rate of total liquidity. Total liquidity consists of cash and 
deposits in Vietnamese dong plus foreign currency deposits^. For the same target of total 
liquidity there would be several combinations of Vietnam dong monetary aggregate and 
foreign currency deposits. The growth rate of total liquidity might not properly reflect the 
stance of monetary policy in Vietnam's economy. For example, the increase of US dollar 
deposits in banking system induced by higher US dollar interest rate could mean higher 
growth rate of total liquidity but it does not mean that the SBV is implementing a 
monetary easing. Thus, achieving the target on growth rate of total liquidity should be 
assessed with caution. 
^ Target for new money issuance is not released to the public. 
" For example, in November 2004 the Governor of SBV presented directions of monetary policy on credit 
growth, exchange rate and interest rate policies for the year 2005 in an interview with Vietnam Economic 
Times (VET 2004). 
^ There is no data on the volume of foreign currencies in circulation in the form of cash. 
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Second is the target for growth rate of credit in the economy, which consists of credit in 
Vietnamese dong and in foreign currencies. The SBV pays close attention to the growth 
rate and the quality of credit activity because of its relation with economic growth target 
and the stability of the banking system (SBV 2004). 
Third are targets for exchange rate and interest rates. The exchange rate of Vietnamese 
dong with respect to US dollar is under the management of the SBV and the target for 
Vietnamese dong/US dollar exchange rate depreciation of approximately 1 per cent per 
year has been archived in recent years (SBV 2005). Furthermore, the SBV also in some 
cases indicates its intention with respect to interest rate target. For example, the 
Governor of SBV states that the target for Vietnamese dong interest rate in 2005 is the 
same level of 2004 (Nguyen 2004). 
In conclusion, the SBV has established targets for its monetary policy and strategies to 
achieve those targets. However, as the targets are defined annually, the predictability of 
monetary policy in the long term is limited. As changes in monetary policy usually have 
impacts over a long horizon, it might be necessary to establish long-term targets for the 
SBV. 
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3.3 Banking reform in Vietnam 
Research on the monetary transmission mechanism in Vietnam could provide useful 
results if two more questions are answered: whether the banking regulatory and 
institutional framework in Vietnam has been improved to encourage banks to operate on 
commercial terms; and whether the state owned-commercial banks (SOCBs) in Vietnam 
are moving towards being profit maximizing concerns. 
On the institutional side, there have been some notable and positive developments in 
recent years. First, in July 2000 the Deposit Insurance of Vietnam (DIV) was established 
as a separate legal entity to the SBV by the Prime Minister^. Deposit insurance is 
compulsory for all state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock banks, foreign bank 
branches, financial companies and people's credit funds in Vietnam regarding personal 
deposits. These institutions are required to pay a fixed premium ratio of 0.15 per cent per 
annum of average balance of personal deposits to the DIV^. For an individual's deposits 
in one bank, the insurance covers up to a maximum of 30 million Vietnamese dongs. At 
the start, deposits made by private enterprises were not covered by the current deposit 
insurance scheme. However, in 2005 deposits made by cooperative team, private 
enterprises and partnerships are allowed to be covered by the insurance. Furthermore, the 
maximum insurance payable to a depositor was raised to 50 million Vietnamese dongs. 
Currently, foreign currency deposits are not covered by the deposit insurance. The DIV 
® The Deposit Insurance of Vietnam was established pursuant to the Decision No.218/1999/QD-TTg dated 
Nov 9th 1999 and Decision No.75/2000/QD-TTg dated June ZS"" 2000. 
' The DIV are currently studying to change from fixed premium ratio to risk-based premium mechanism 
(DIV 2006). 
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also offer special loan to insured institutions which are at risk of insolvency^ Kovsted et 
al (2005) argue that the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme is likely to 
improve public trust in the financial sector. 
Second, in 1999 the Credit Information Centre under the control of the SBV was 
established (Decision No.68/1999/QD-NHNN9). This centre is authorized to collect, 
analyze and provide information on enterprises and credit institutions. Since 2002 the 
Credit Information Centre has started to carry out the classification of borrowers 
according to their repayment capabilities. The operation of the Credit Information Centre 
is a useful source for the SBV to monitor the situation in the financial markets and for 
commercial banks to assess credit worthiness of their customers. 
In addition, the Vietnamese government established a Registry Centre for Secured 
Transactions in 2002. The main objective of this centre is to resolve conflicting creditor 
claims on moveable assets (except ships and planes). This centre could improve overall 
transparency in the credit market and provide protection to banks in their lending 
operations (Kovsted et al 2002). 
Furthermore, in October 2002 the State-owned Bank for Social Policies (BSP) was 
established operating on non-profit principles (Decision I31/2002/QD-TTg). The policy-
lending programs from all other SOCBs have been transferred to the BSP. Thus, the 
operations of all SOCBs except the BSP are supposed to have been on commercial terms 
since 2003. 
' Decision No. l06/2002/QD-HDQT of the Board of Directors of the DIV dated June 24"' 2002. 
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In addition to the positive developments on the institutional side, there have been 
developments on the regulatory side. The SBV has allowed further deregulation of 
interest rates. The process of deregulating interest rates began in 1996 when commercial 
banks were allowed to set interest rates on domestic currency deposits. In 1998 the 
required spread between average deposit and lending interest rates of 0.35 per cent per 
month imposed by the SBV on commercial banks was abolished. In June 1999 three 
types of ceilings on lending rates (for short-term, medium and long-term loans and loans 
provided by Credit Funds to their members) were replaced by one ceiling rate of 1.15 per 
cent per month. In August 2000 a new base rate mechanism was introduced to replace the 
ceiling rate (Decision No.241 and 243/2000/QD-NHNN). The SBV stipulates a base rate 
based on the lending interest rates that nine selected commercial banks apply to their best 
customers. Credit institutions which include commercial banks are allowed to set their 
own lending rates within a trading band of 0.3 per cent for short-term loans and 0.5 per 
cent for medium and long-term loans in relation to the announced base rate. In June 2002, 
the trading band in relation to the base rate is abolished. Commercial banks were allowed 
to negotiate lending rates with customers based on their assessment of risk of each loan 
(Decision 546/2002/QD-NHNN). Thus, the lending rate on domestic currency was 
liberalized. 
In 1991 the SBV allowed the commercial banks to take deposits in foreign currency 
(Decision 08-NH/QD). Interest rates on personal foreign currency deposits were 
deregulated in 1999. In August 2000, the SBV permitted credit institutions to set their 
own lending rates in foreign currencies within a band of 1-2.5 per cent of the Singapore 
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Inter-bank market rates. In June 2001 interest rate ceilings on foreign currency loans were 
abolished. However, due to capital control, interest rates on foreign currency deposits and 
foreign currency loans still differ from international rates. Finally in March 2007, the 
interest rate applied to foreign currency deposits made by enterprises and government 
institutions was deregulated (Decision No.07/2007/QD-NHNN). However, the effect of 
this last step in interest rate deregulation in financial markets might be limited because a 
large share of foreign currency deposits in the banking system are in personal savings and 
interest rates applied to personal savings have already been deregulated since 1999. 
These steps should allow banks greater autonomy in their operations and to price risks 
better. Although interest rates have been gradually deregulated, the SBV does not 
encourage commercial banks to compete with each other using only interest rates (Son 
2004). Thus, except for the foreign bank branches, the four largest SOCBs and joint-stock 
banks from time to time have arrangements to keep their deposit and lending rates on the 
Vietnam dong within certain levels. However, those arrangements cannot be kept for long 
as each SOCB has to protect its own market share against not only the other SOCBs but 
also the joint-stock banks and foreign banks. Thus, interest rates are generally moved due 
to the competition between banks and the balance of demand and supply in the market. 
The round of interest rate rises in 2005, which the SOCBs started, provides an example 
(Phuong 2005).^ 
' The arrangements of interest rates are negotiated by SOCBs and joint-stocic banks in Vietnam's Banker 
Association (VBA) forum. In March and early April 2005 two SOCBs: Vietindebank and Vietcombank 
raised interest rates first, other banks then followed. On 8 April 2005 VBA announced the new levels for 
taking VND deposits that SOCBs and joint-stock banks should follow in order to stabilize the money 
market. For example, the joint-stock banks should offer interest rates higher than the SOCBs level but no 
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As interest rates were being deregulated, competition in the banlcing sector has led to a 
decline in the interest margin in all SOCBs. Unteroberdoerster (2004) shows that the 
interest rate margin for the domestic currency at the four largest SOCBs has fallen 
steadily from 7 per cent in the first quarter of 2000 to approximately 3 per cent in the 
third quarter in 2003. However, the declining interest margin could be a problem for the 
SOCBs if risk provisioning is not adequate, because the interest rate margin is supposed 
to cover only service costs, not capital costs. 
The implementation of the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the US in the banking sector 
in 2002 has allowed US banks to expand their operations in Vietnam (WB 2004). 
Furthermore, since April 2004 and from February 2005'°, EU banks have been granted 
similar treatment to the US banks. These developments should create a more level 
playing field and make the market more competitive. 
Another improvement in banking regulation is in foreign exchange control. The foreign 
exchange surrender requirement, which had been applied at the time of the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997-8, was gradually reduced and finally terminated in April 2003. 
Furthermore, many more foreign exchange instruments have been gradually allowed to 
trade in the market to satisfy the needs of enterprises and residents (SBV 2005). Thus, 
these developments should help banks and firms to operate on commercial terms in the 
more than 0.5 per cent per annum higher. However, banks did not fol low these arrangements. In August 
2008 , the V B A organized new negotiation and proposed new round of interest rate rises. 
Decis ion 327 /2004 /QD-NHNN dated 01/04/2004 and Decision 210 /2005 /QD-NHNN dated 28/02/2005 
on adjustment of mobilizing ratio in Vietnam dong for European Union foreign bank branches. 
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foreign exchange market. 
Unteroberdoerster et al (2003) argue that, the reform of SOCBs in Vietnam is closely 
linked with reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) because SOEs are the main 
recipients of credit from SOCBs. The inefficiency in the SOE sector could create a large 
ratio of non-performing loans or bad debts for the banking sector, especially for the 
SOCBs. Table 3.4 shows the decline in the proportion of SOCBs' total credit as well as 
overall bank credit to SOEs in the period 1998-2006. This means the banking system and 
SOCBs in particular have become less exposed to SOEs. 
Table 3.4 Credit to state-owned enterprises from the banking system, 1998-2006 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total credit to the 72.5 112.7 155.7 189 231 296 420 533 693 
economy (Trillion VND) 
Credit to SOEs 38.1 54.3 69.9 79.7 89.5 105.4 142.9 181.3 218.5 
(Trillion VND) 
Credit to SOEs as 
percentage of total credit 
to the economy (%) 52.5 48.1 44.9 42.2 38.7 35.5 34 32.8 31.5 
Total credit extended by 59 76.5 114.1 136 175.4 214 .8 315.3 381.4 440 
SOCBs (Trillion VND) 
SOCBs credit to SOEs 34.2 na 61.3 72.9 81.6 95.7 145.8 158 175 
(Trillion VND) 
Credit to SOEs as 
percentage of total credit 
extended by SOCBs (%) 58 na 53.7 53.6 46.5 44.5 46.2 41.4 39.7 
Credit to other sector as 
percentage of total credit 
extended by SOCBs (%) 42 na 46.3 46.4 53.5 55.5 53.8 58.6 60.3 
Source: Author's calculations. 
There are two reasons for this. First, in 2000 the new Enterprise Law was enacted. This 
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Law facilitates the establishment of private firms in Vietnam. Vo et al (2002) note that in 
only two years (2000-2001) the number of new private enterprises established under the 
new Law was higher than the total number of private enterprises established during the 
period 1991-9. It is arguable that the bank credit market has become more competitive 
because more private enterprises operate in the market as the stock exchange is an option 
for only a limited number of firms. Thus, the SOCBs have an opportunity to expand their 
credit to the private sector in order to maximize their profit and to compete with private 
banks. Table 3.4 shows that the ratio of total credit from SOCBs to private enterprises has 
increased from approximately 40 per cent in 1998 to nearly 60 per cent in 2006. 
Second, the reform of SOEs in recent years has reduced their number from 6,000 in 1997 
to around 4,000 in mid 2004 (WB 2004). Thus, nearly 2,000 SOEs have been liquidated, 
sold or equitised. Furthermore, in 2004 the Prime Minister issued Decision 155/2004/QD-
TTg to limit the number of sectors considered strategic (not to be equitised), which has 
paved the way for equitization in economic activities which have previously been 
reserved for the state. This means the number of SOEs receiving credit from SOCBs 
could be reduced further. 
Since 2000 the banking system in general and SOCBs in particular were being 
restructured with the assistance of the World Bank, ADB and IMF. The restructuring of 
SOCBs focused on addressing the problem of non-performing loans. According to the 
SBV, the ratio of non-performing loans reached 11.4 per cent of total outstanding loan 
volume, 10.8 per cent in SOCBs and 12.4 per cent in joint-stock banks (Kovsted et al 
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2005). However, estimates by IMF using diagnostic audits based on international 
accounting standards suggested tliat the ratio of non-performing loans in SOCBs could be 
much higher (Kovsted et al 2005). Gradual implementation of international accounting 
and auditing standards was one aspect of the restructuring process to ensure the 
transparency in SOCB operations. 
The SBV has made an important improvement in the process of changing Vietnamese 
accounting standards in accordance with international accounting standards. In November 
2000, Decision 488 by the SBV required commercial banks to make provision for their 
risky loans based on overdue debt. This decision also required that assets should be 
classified according to assessed risk. Furthermore, the regulation on provisioning was 
strengthened in Decision 1627 in December 2001. First, it stipulated that the entire loan 
balance should be classified as overdue debt if any interest and/or principal was overdue. 
Second, the provisioning should be based on the estimated risk level when the loan is 
taken up. Third, banks could use risk-provisioning funds to compensate for losses from 
unforeseen circumstances such as natural disasters. 
However, Unteroberdoerster et al (2003) noted that the implementation of the new loan 
classification in some SOCBs remains non-transparent. Thus, Decision 493 in April 2005 
by the SBV requested commercial banks" to classify their loans into five types and to 
make provision for each type of loan according to a stipulated ratio. The riskier of the 
" Foreign bank branches are allowed to classify loans and make provision according to their Head Office 
regulations but they need the approval of the SBV (Clause 1 Decision 493/2005/QD-NHNN dated April 
22"'' 2005). 
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loan, the higher is the ratio of provision appHed that debt. The objective of a stricter 
accounting standard is to regulate the banking sector through the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR). At the end of 2004, the capital adequacy ratios in all SOCBs were around 5.6 per 
cent (SBV 2005). Although SOCBs have received about 10 trillion Vietnamese dongs in 
capital injections from the government, SOCBs in Vietnam have not reached the capital 
adequacy ratio of 8 per cent stipulated in the Basel II Accord. However, stringent CAR 
regulations could lead to a decline in bank lending and affect monetary transmission 
process if banks are poorly capitalized (Tanaka 2002). Therefore the SBV in April 2005 
required all SOCBs to achieve the CAR of 8 per cent in three years and the increase in 
each year is equal to one third of the differential between the existing ratio and the Basel 
convention.'^ That means SOCBs are gradually following international standards in their 
operations. Decision 121 in January 2005 by the SBV allowed a greater role for the 
independent auditor in the banking sector and paved the way for the use of foreign 
auditors by SOCBs. This is an important step in the process of listing one of the largest 
SOCBs (Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam) on the stock market '^ The equitization 
process could lead to more efficiency and greater transparency in SOCBs' operation. 
Another aspect of restructuring of SOCBs is on technical issues. Vietnam's Law on 
Credit Institutions allows banks to carry on secured and unsecured lending to all types of 
borrowers depending on the banks' own assessment of risk. However, the SOCBs lack 
skill and expertise in assessing risk, especially in lending to the private sector (CIEM 
2002). With assistance from international financial institutions, SOCBs have carried on 
Decision 457/2005/QD-NHNN by State Bank of Vietnam dated 19 April 2005. 
The Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam is partially equitizied in December 2007 (VET 2007). 
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restructuring programs. In regard to credit operations, all SOCBs have constructed and 
implemented new lending management procedures and credit handbooks in accordance 
with international practice since 2004 (SBV 2005). Relating to organizational 
restructuring, the World Bank has helped SOCBs to implement the Asset-Liability 
management, internal audit and management information system modules. Thus, much 
progress is being made in the technical aspects of banking reforms. With reform in the 
institutional and regulatory framework, the SOCBs have achieved some improvements in 
their operation. By the end of 2005, the non-performing loans in the banking system had 
been reduced to 4.4 per cent according to Vietnam accounting standards of loan 
classification in Decision 493 (Tran 2006). 
Furthermore, there were some major developments in the financial sector in the period 
1999-2006. First, foreign insurance firms were allowed to set up 100 per cent owned 
branches in 1999 in life insurance. The opening of the insurance market was further 
expanded by the Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement. This agreement required that 
entry to all types of insurance would be permitted for US majority-owned and US-owned 
companies after three and five years, respectively (Kovsted et al 2005). Second, the Stock 
Exchange opened in July 2000. Initially the stock market was not a major source of 
funding for companies (Kovsted et al 2005). In recent years the number of firms and the 
value of stocks and bonds listed in the Stock Exchange have increased rapidly. At the end 
of 2006 the market value of stock market was equivalent to 17 per cent of Vietnam's 
GDP (Tu 2007). The rapid growth of stock market has raised concern to the government. 
In order to limit the fall-out on banking system from a possible stock "bubble" the 
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government and the SBV''* has carried out several prudential measures (Lee et al 2007). 
As a result, the stock market has slowdown in second half of 2007. 
In conclusion, reform in the banking sector in past years in Vietnam has generated 
pressure and allowed banks to operate on a more commercial basis and has led SOCBs to 
move towards profit maximization, especially since 2000. 
Decision 03/2007/QD-NHNN dated January 19"' 2007 on new regulations on bank capital adequacy, 
liquidity ratios, and lending and investment limits, which have restricted scope on bank lending for 
purchase of stocks. Directive 03 by the SBV dated May 28"' 2007 limits banks' total securities-related 
credit to less than 3 per cent of their total loan outstanding. 
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3.4 Development of monetary policy instruments 
In implementing monetary policy, the SBV has used both direct and indirect instruments. 
Because the financial market in Vietnam is underdeveloped, direct instruments are more 
effective and more frequently used (IMF 2005). There have been some major 
developments in how the SBV has used these instruments in the period 1999-2006. 
First, the required reserve is the main instrument for the SBV in implementing monetary 
policy changes in Vietnam. The SBV imposes minimum levels of reserves on commercial 
banks for both domestic currency deposits and foreign currency deposits. There different 
reserve ratios in Vietnamese dong (VND) deposits are required for different type of 
banks'^. Lower ratios are usually applied to the Bank for Social Policies, small credit 
funds and the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development as a subsidy to the poor 
because those credit institutions usually operate in rural and mountainous areas. In the 
period 1999-2006, bank reserve requirement ratios were adjusted downwards for VND 
deposits and upwards for foreign currency deposits to implement an expansionary 
monetary policy on the one hand, and to keep dollarization levels in check on the other. 
Figure 3.1 shows the required reserve ratios applied to most of the banks with regard to 
the deposits in Vietnamese dong and in foreign currency deposits with terms less than 12 
months. Between 1999 and 2003 the SBV reduced substantially the required reserve ratio 
Decision 796/NHNN-2004 in June 2004 on required reserve of Vietnamese dong deposits of less tiian 12 
months stated that: the ratio applied to SOCBs (except the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development), 
foreign bank branches, urban joint-stock banks, joint-venture banks, financial companies and leasing 
companies is 5 per cent; the ratio applied to Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development is 4 per cent, the 
ratio applied to rural joint-stock banks, credit cooperatives and Credit Funds is 2 percent ; and the ratio 
applied to Bank for Social Policy is zero. 
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for Vietnamese dong to implement an expansionary monetary policy. However, since 
2004, the required reserve ratio has been increased. 
Figure 3.1 Required reserve ratios for Vietnamese dong and 
foreign currency deposits, 1999-2004. 16 
16 r 
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Note: The vertical axis is in per cent 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
The second instrument is the exchange rate. In general, the exchange rate is one of the 
economy's external policies and not an instrument of monetary policy. However, in 
Vietnam, the exchange rate is considered a monetary policy instrument because it is 
directly under the control of the SBV. First, capital control could permit the SBV to 
monitor the official and private flows of foreign exchange through the banking system. 
There are regulations on behalf of Vietnamese government and the SBV on measures of 
" New required reserve ratios applied in May 2007 are 10 per cent with both Vietnamese dong and foreign 
currencies deposits. 
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foreign exchange managements for residents'^, enterprises'^ and foreign indirect 
investment" . Second, by requiring SOCBs to satisfy the foreign exchange demands 
according to certain stated priorities and by implementing the foreign exchange surrender 
rule, the SBV could maintain the official fixed exchange rate for a certain period. Third, 
in order to monitor the foreign exchange market, the SBV requires banks to submit daily 
reports on the trading volume, prices and actual foreign exchange position of each bank^°. 
The SBV has carried out major devaluations since 1997 (a 6 per cent devaluation to the 
US dollar in February 1997, a further 10 per cent in August 1997 and another 10 per cent 
devaluation in May 1998). These devaluations allowed Vietnam to maintain 
competitiveness relative to other Asian countries which also had substantial exchange 
rate devaluations during the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-8. However, the devaluations 
brought about a significant increase in dollarisation levels in the banking system in the 
period 2000-01. There are two reasons for that phenomenon. First, individuals and 
" Prime Minister's Decision No.l70/1999/QD-TTg dated 19/08/1999 and SBV's Circular 02/2000/QD-
NHNN7 dated 24/02/2000 on regulations on receiving and using inward foreign exchange remittance by 
Vietnamese residents. SBV's Decision 1437/QD-NHNN dated 19/11/2001 on regulations on purposes, 
limits and procedures for buying and outward remitting of foreign exchange by Vietnamese residents. 
SBV's Circular 3/1999/TT-NHNN7 in August 1999 on conditions for enterprises to borrow offshore and 
SBV's Decision 26/2000/QD-NHNN7 in January 2000 on planning and executing annual limits of offshore 
borrowings by enterprises. SBV's Circular 01/2001/TT-NHNN dated 19/01/2001 on foreign exchange 
regulations regarding foreign direct investment by Vietnam's domestic enterprises. 
SBV's Decision 998/2002/QD-NHNN dated 13/09/2002 on foreign exchange regulations regarding the 
trading of foreign resident and foreign organisation in the Stock exchange. The foreign indirect investment 
reaches US dollar 1 billion in 2006, equivalent of approximately 1.4 per cent of Vietnam's GDP (Ha 2007). 
The daily report on foreign exchange activity was abolished on January 2006 by the SBV in Decision 
07/2006/QD-NHNN because the modernization of banking payment and information systems has allowed 
the commercial banks to monitor their foreign exchange positions on a daily basis (SBV 2006). 
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enterprises changed their holdings from domestic currency deposits to US dollar deposits 
to maintain the value of their assets in case of further devaluation. Second, the interest 
rate of Vietnamese dong was on a downward trend and the interest rate of US dollars was 
on upward trend in this period. Thus, by keeping US dollar deposits, individuals and 
enterprises could gain from any future devaluation and increased interest rate of US 
dollar deposits. 
Before 1999 the SBV set and announced the levels of official exchange rates between the 
Vietnamese dong (VND) and US dollar (USD) and the trading band within which 
commercial banks could trade foreign exchange. In February 1999, the official exchange 
rate was replaced by an average interbank exchange rate of USD/VND determined and 
announced by the SBV. In February 1999 the trading band for USD/VND exchange rate 
was set at 0.1 per cent of the average interbank exchange rate on the previous day. In July 
2002 this trading band was widened to 0.25 per cent. Recently, in December 2006, the 
trading band for USD/VND exchange rate was relaxed to 0.5 per cent. The IMF (2005) 
noted that the SBV has tried to limit the depreciation of the exchange rate in the range of 
1 to 2 per cent per year in recent years^'. 
The third instrument is interest rate control. The SBV could control the interest rate in the 
money market by regulating the deposit and lending rates of both domestic and foreign 
currencies. However, since 1996 the SBV has gradually abolished most types of interest 
rate controls. 
In January 2005 the IMF classified the exchange rate regime of Vietnam to the category of conventional 
pegged arrangements. 
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The fourth instrument is open market operations. This instrument of monetary policy was 
introduced in 1998 and was considered an important component of financial sector 
reform. Open market operations are carried out by outright sales and purchases of 
securities or repurchase agreements. Initially, due to the requirement that only Treasury 
bills and short-term SBV bills (shorter than one year) are eligible to be traded, the use of 
open market operations was limited because the participants found it difficult to obtain a 
desired level of risk and asset diversification (Kovsted et al 2005). In 2003 securities with 
maturity of more than one year are allowed to be traded. Thus, since 2003 the open 
market operations have been frequently used as a key instrument for the SBV to achieve 
monetary policy targets (IMF 2005). Other indirect monetary instruments such as 
rediscounting, refinancing and SWAP arrangements for foreign exchange have also been 
used by the SBV. The rediscount and refinancing instruments require commercial banks 
to have collateral in the form of valuable papers or bonds for their borrowings. However, 
there is a quota for rediscount for each commercial bank. The rediscount rate is the lower 
interest rate and the refinancing rate is the upper rate for lending from the SBV. Together 
they define the band of interest rate for open market operations. 
Another instrument that the SBV has used is credit control. The SBV applied selectively 
the credit growth limit with some banks, mainly joint-stock banks, in order to control the 
financial stability in those banks (Kovsted et al 2005). Furthermore, in managing creit 
activity in banking system, the SBV also give instructions on proportion of foreign 
currency lending and the usage of short term funds for medium and long term lending 
(SBV 2006). Finally, policy-based lending is also considered a type of monetary policy 
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instrument. Although the operation of policy-based lending has been gradually separated 
from the SOCBs to a newly established specialized bank, the lending operations of 
SOCBs still follow instructions from the SBV in some cases. For example, in 2000 the 
SBV instructed the SOCBs to give preference to loans for the import of fertiliser and for 
the export of rice^^ and promised to use the refinancing instrument to support the SOCBs. 
Similar conditions also applied to syndicated loans offered by SOCBs to major industrial 
projects which are exempted from certain prudential regulations (IMF 2003). 
" Circular 01/2000/TT-NHNNI4 by the Governor of the SBV on guidance on ensuring bank loans to 
import fertiliser and gather rice for export. 
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3.5 Monetary policy and dollarization in Vietnam 
The Banking Law of Vietnam Article 2 stipulates that national monetary policy serves 
three purposes: to stabilise the value of the Vietnamese currency, manage inflation and 
encourage economic development. This objective is broad and the State Bank of Vietnam 
(SBV) has a difficult and complex responsibility. Williamson (2001) and Camen f2006) 
argues that in theory, the combination of pegged exchange rate with a horizontal band 
and control of both capital inflows and outflows^^ of Vietnamese firms and residents 
would allow the SBV to retain the independence of its monetary policy with some 
sterilization. 
Another problem for the SBV in operating its monetary policy is the use of US dollars in 
the Vietnamese economy. The SBV regulations^" allow Vietnamese firms and residents 
to open and maintain foreign currency (time and savings) deposits. Because there are no 
reliable data on the foreign currencies in circulation, the ratio of foreign currency deposits 
(FCD) in the banking system over broad money is usually used as a proxy for the degree 
of dollarization in Vietnam. According to the Balinos et al (1999), a country is classified 
as a moderately dollarized economy if the ratio of FCD over broad money is lower than 
30 per cent. Figure 3.2 shows that, on average, Vietnam would be considered a 
moderately dollarized economy. 
" SBV Decision No. l60/QD-NH7 dated 08/06/1996 and Decision No. 1437/2001/QD-NHNN dated 
19/11/2001 on capital account and current account controls. 
SBV's Circular No.01/1999/TT-NHNN7 on mobilization of foreign currency deposits in the banking 
system. 
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Figure 3.2 Foreign currency deposits in Vietnam, 1999-2006 
Ratio of FCD/Broad Money 
VND-USD interest rate differential 
Exchange rate depreciat ion 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Note: The vertical axis is in per cent. 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
The legal framework in Vietnam has a notable point which may help to limit 
dollarization. Foreign currencies are not allowed as legal payment in the domestic market 
(SBV 2000). The Vietnamese dong (VND) is the only legal means of payment in the 
domestic clearing system. Thus, if a firm has foreign exchange and has to pay a debt to 
another firm, although the latter may need foreign exchange, the former has to sell its 
foreign exchange to a bank and make the payment in VND. The latter uses the received 
money to buy foreign exchange from a bank. 
However, households use foreign currencies, the US dollar in particular, as an unofficial 
medium of exchange outside the banking system because of its convenience in 
facilitating large transactions (IMF 2003). Before 2004, the largest single denomination 
of Vietnamese currency notes was equal to approximately USD 6 (the largest and most 
commonly used of US dollar notes is USD 100). Since the start of 2004 a larger 
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denomination note, worth approximately USD 30, has been introduced to facilitate large 
cash transactions as a measure to reduce the use of the US dollar in unofficial payments 
(SBV 2004). 
Unterroberdoerster (2002) suggests that the changes in foreign currency deposits are 
linked to fluctuations in the exchange rate and interest rate differential between the 
Vietnamese dong and the US dollar. This is because under the administered interest rate 
regime before 2001, the interest rate on VND had not been set so that the interest rate 
parity between VND and USD was maintained. Figure 3.2 shows that in the period 1999-
2001, the interest rate differential between the VND and USD, after taking into account 
the depreciation of VND, was in favor of USD deposits. This led to an increase in the 
ratio of FCD/broad money in this period. 
In theory, the existence of dollarization can affect the effectiveness of a country's 
monetary policy. However, the SBV can influence the use of foreign currencies in the 
domestic market by requiring banks to maintain reserve requirements for foreign 
currency deposits. Also, studies by Ngo (1997) on dollarization and Vo (1997) on 
inflation stabilization in Vietnam in the period 1989-95 show that reduction in the money 
supply was the main reason for Vietnam achieving lower inflation. This means that, in 
practice, monetary policy was still effective in this period although Vietnam experienced 
moderate levels of dollarization. 
Figure 3.3 shows the similar movement of broad money growth and inflation in Vietnam 
during the period 1999-2006. This suggests that the growth in broad money (including 
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foreign currency deposits) might help to explain the fluctuation of inflation in this period. 
Figure 3.3 Inflation and broad money (including FCD) growth in Vietnam, 1999-2006 
Broad Money — ^ Inflation 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Note: The vertical axis is in per cent. 
Source: Author ' s calculations. 
Studies by Reinhart et al (2003) on dollarization in developing countries also find a clear 
link between changes in monetary aggregates and inflation. They conclude that high 
dollarization does not seriously impede the effective conduct of monetary policy in 
economies with regard to inflation control. 
Reinhart et al (2003) also suggest another way to assess the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in a dollarized economy, by evaluating the velocity of money. According to the 
quantity theory of money, the demand for money multiplied by the velocity of money 
equals the price multiplied by output: MV=PY. As dollarization usually occurs in 
economies which experience high inflation, inflation and dollarization would make the 
demand for domestic money unstable and less predictable. Furthermore, they argue that 
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the credibility of the exchange rate peg also has a large impact on dollarization and 
money demand. Households and firms could prefer foreign currencies as a store of value 
and a medium of exchange if they expect devaluation. Hence, given the generally under-
developed nature of the banking system and prevalence of government controls, firms 
and households could be afraid of depositing foreign currencies in the domestic banking 
system due to the possibility that the government would freeze their deposits. The low 
confidence in the banking system would be reflected in a high velocity of money. Thus, 
monetary policy could become less effective in a dollarized economy. 
Figure 3.4 Velocity 'of broad money including FCD in Vietnam, 1999-2006 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
GDP/ BROAD MONEY 
Source: Author's calculations. 
However, the evidence in Vietnam in the period 1999-2006 does not support this view. 
Velocity of broad money has been declining gradually despite changes in the 
' Velocity of broad money is measured as the ratio of GDP to the end of period broad money. 
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dollarization level. Two inferences can be made from the behavior of money velocity. 
First, the lower inflation has reduced the opportunity cost of holding domestic currency 
and might make the demand for domestic currency more stable. Second, the acceptance 
of foreign currency deposits in the domestic banking system appears to have a positive 
effect on the financial deepening of the economy because it facilitates the re-
intermediation of foreign currencies in the economy^^. To a certain extent, the movement 
of foreign currency deposits in the banking system may also reflect the public 's 
confidence in the SBV's monetary policy and the domestic banking system. Firms and 
households only maintain foreign currency deposits when they believe in the soundness 
of the banking system. In this case the fluctuations of foreign currency deposits depend 
on the interest rate differentials between foreign currencies and domestic currency as well 
as the expectation of movement of exchange rate. In the period 1999-2006, the SBV by 
using its instruments and maintaining proper targets in interest rate and exchange rate, 
was able to influence the foreign currency deposit levels in the banking system. Thus, 
domestic monetary policy is still effective despite dollarization. 
In conclusion, both the correlation coefficients between inflation rate, money growth and 
GDP growth, as well as the velocity of money, could support the view that monetary 
policy is still effective in Vietnam despite dollarization. 
" Balinos et al (1999) also argue that allowing FCD in the domestic financial system enhances the 
opportunity for re-intermediation in the economy, facilitates the integration of the domestic market into the 
world market and lowers the cost of international financial transaction. 
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CHAPTER 4 STRUCTURAL VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION MODEL OF 
MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN VIETNAM 
4.1 Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model 
Two types of econometric model are often used in analyzing the monetary transmission 
mechanism: the structural macro econometric model and the structural vector 
autoregression model. The structural macro econometric model has been criticized for its 
theoretical and econometric assumptions (Sims 1980). Thus, most empirical studies on 
the effects of monetary policy use a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach 
proposed by Sims (1980). An SVAR model is a system of equations providing the 
interactions between the current values of each variable in the system and past values of 
all variables. An SVAR model allows the use of a small number of key variables and 
applies minimum restrictions in order to analyze the effect of monetary policy shocks on 
an economy without a need to explain the very large number of variables. 
Consider the simple three variable system: 
yt = - b , 2 Z t - b , 3 g t + ynyt-i +yi2Zt-i +yi3gt-i + eyt (1) 
Z, - - bilYt -b23gt + y2iyM + y22Zt-l + y23gt-l + Ezt (2) 
gt = - b3iyt- b32Zt + y3iyt-i + y32Zt-i + y33gt-i + % (3) 
where it is assumed that y,, Zt and g, are stationary; Syt, Sgt and ezt are white noise 
disturbances and uncorrelated to each other. Equations (1); (2) and (3) are called a 
primitive system. The primitive system can not be estimated directly due to 
multicollinearity problem - the correlation between regressors and error terms. 
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We can also write the system as: 
y, + b |2Z,+ b,3gt = Yiiyt.i + + Yngt-i + Syt 
bllYt + Zt + b23gt = Yiiyt-i + y22Zt.l + y23gt-l + fizt 
b3 iy t+ b32Zt + g t = ysiy,-! + Y32Z,.i + y33gt-l + % 
Using matrix algebra, we can write the system as: 
BoX, = BiXt.i + £t 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
' 1 bn As" >11 h i Yn ' y , ' 
In which Bq = 1 B , = 721 722 Yii Xt = et= 
3^2 1 731 Y n ^33. 
Pre-multiplying with Bq"' then the reduced form or standard form will be: 
X, =AoX,.i + Ct (8) 
where Ao = Bo"'Bi (9) 
and Ct = Bo"' et or 8, = BoCt (10) 
We can define ay as an element in row / and column j of the matrix A, and ei, as an 
element / of the vector e;. The reduced-form equations, which contain past variables only, 
can be estimated directly: 
yt = aiiyt-i + a,2Z,.i + angt . i + Cyt (11) 
Zt a2iyt.i + a22Z,.i + a23gt.i + e^t (12) 
g t = a2iyM + a22Zt.i + a23gt.i + Cg, (13) 
However, the number of parameters of the primitive system is larger than that of the 
reduced form model. Thus we need to impose some restrictions in order to recover 
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information from the estimated system through the contemporaneous relationship or 
vector Bo. 
There are two ways of recovering the parameters. The most common identification 
scheme is the recursive assumption in which shocks are transmitted between variables in 
the system in a one-way restriction. This is often called the Choleski decomposition. It 
restricts the contemporaneous matrix of structural coefficients (matrix Bq) to be the lower 
triangular and all coefficients to be above are zero (Enders 1995). In the primitive system 
of equations (4), (5) and (6), for example, the coefficients b^ , b u and b23 could be 
restricted to zero. Then we have a new system: 
yt = Yiiyt-i + yi2z,.i + yng t - i + Syt ( i 4 ) 
baiYt + Zt = yaiYt-i + yii^i-x + y23gt-i + Szt (15) 
b 3 i y t + b32Zt + g t = y s i y t - i + y^iA-x + yssgt-i + % ( i6 ) 
Given the restrictions (which might be suggested by a particular economic model), it is 
clear that gt does not have contemporaneous effects on yt and Zt but yt has 
contemporaneous effects on both Zt and gt. Thus, the impulse responses resulting from the 
recursive system depend on the causal ordering of the variables involved. Therefore, 
different assumptions of how variables in the model interact with each other will lead to 
different orderings of variables. Hence, it should be noted that the results of the recursive 
VAR system, such as impulse response functions and variance decomposition obtained 
from different ordering schemes, may be different. 
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The other identification scheme is the non-recursive approach which does not require the 
structural matr ix of coeff icients (matrix Bo) to be the lower triangular. For example in the 
system of equations (4), (5) and (6), the coefficient b2i is restricted to zero (this restriction 
might be suggested by a specific economic argument) . Then we have a new system of 
equations as fol lows: 
yt + b i 2 Z t + b , 3 g t = y i i y t - i + y i 2 Z t . i + y i 3 g t - i + eyt (17) 
Zt + b23gt = y2iyt - l + y22Zt.l + y23gt-l + Szt (18) 
b 3 , y , + b32Zt + g t = y3iyt - l + y32Zt-l + y33gt-l + % (19) 
Thus, with this non-recursive assumption, any shock to any variable in the system will 
af fect other variables contemporaneously. Therefore, results obtained from the model 
depend on the specific non-recursive assumptions applied to the structural matrix of 
coeff ic ients (matrix Bo). 
However , not only benefi ts but also costs come with the SVAR model. First, is the 
diff icul ty in interpreting the outcomes. An SVAR model focuses on estimating the 
impulse response funct ions and variance decomposit ion function instead of the parameter 
coeff icients . Second, is the assumption of a recursive structure or non-recursive structure 
on the system of endogenous variables in the SVAR model and the economic theory to 
support that assumption. Although there are some costs, the SVAR model is widely used 
in research on monetary policy because it makes few assumptions on the structure of the 
economy and focuses on obtaining good representation of interactions between policy 
and economic variables, which appear to be the main concern of policy makers (Morsink 
and Bayoumi 2001, Fung 2002) 
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Existing empirical studies on the effects of monetary policy using the recursive approach 
find evidence of several 'puzzles ' (Kim and Roubini 2001). First, is the 'liquidity puzzle ' : 
a positive shock on monetary policy identified by an increase in monetary aggregate leads 
to an initial increase rather than a decrease in nominal interest rate. Then, is the 'price 
puzzle ' : monetary tightening identified by an increase in interest rate leads to an initial 
increase rather than a decrease in price level. Third, is the 'exchange rate puzzle ' : when 
an increase in interest rate leads to a depreciation instead of an appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate. Finally, is the ' forward discount puzzle ' : if the uncovered interest 
parity holds, a rise in the domestic interest rate mean an increase in the domestic and 
foreign interest differential and that should lead to a persistent depreciation over time 
after initial appreciation. However, evidence from empirical studies suggests that 
appreciation after the increase in interest rate differential is rather persistent than 
expected. In addition to these four puzzles, some studies such as Bernanke and Mihov 
(1995) find the 'output puzzle ' : a loosening monetary policy lead to output to fall slightly 
before beginning to increase. 
To solve the 'puzzles ' some researchers explore the non-recursive approach that allows 
the monetary shocks to be transmitted contemporaneously between variables in the 
monetary reaction functions in two directions. In this case, more economic relationships 
in the structural VAR model need to be identified because the structure of the economy 
and the central bank 's reaction function are explicitly modeled. Non-recursive structural 
VAR models appear to give reasonable explanations of monetary transmission 
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mechanisms in G-7 countries excluding the US (Kim and Roubini 2000), in Australia 
(Brischetto and Voss 1999) and in Thailand (Sodsrichai 2006). 
Although different identification schemes have been applied, there is some consensus on 
how monetary shocks are transmitted (Christiano et al 1998). These transmissions often 
reflect the conventional economic framework and serve as a guide to whether a particular 
identification scheme is reasonable or not. 
4.2 A recursive structural VAR model for monetary transmission in Vietnam 
As explained in the previous chapter, the banking sector in Vietnam was gradually 
reformed during the period 1990-8, and it moved towards a system where banks were 
beginning to operate on a commercial basis. This study focuses on the period 1999-2006 
because the conditions in this period generally satisfy the requirements for analyzing the 
monetary transmission process. First, interest rate controls were gradually deregulated. 
Second, accounting methods in the banking system were being implemented in 
accordance with international standards. However, there is debate on the implementation 
of new accounting methods and valuation of non-performing loans (IMF 2006). Third, 
despite the issue of dollarization in the economy, the SBV was able to maintain the 
effectiveness of its monetary policy, as has been explained in Chapter 3. 
After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-8, as foreign direct investment to Vietnam 
slowed down, monetary policy and the banking system have seemed to play a more 
important role in promoting growth in Vietnam (Gottschang 2001). Facing the slowdown 
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in economic activity the SBV used its monetary instruments as well as moral suasion to 
relax monetary conditions in the market^^. It is probable that, since 1999, monetary policy 
in Vietnam has changed from a tightening to a prudent loosening policy (Pham and Vo 
2005). However, the growth rate remained stable at 5-6 per cent per annum and the 
inflation rate at under 3 per cent per annum in the period 1999-2002. In the period 2003-
2006, the growth rate, and especially the inflation rate, rose rapidly to 6-8 per cent per 
annum. In response to the threat of high inflation, the SBV has changed to a prudent 
tightening policy in recent years (IMF 2005). Thus, this paper examines the transmission 
of monetary policy from 1999 to 2006 - that is, from monetary tightening to loosening 
and then back to tightening again. 
Pham and Vo (2005) use a recursive VAR model to analyze the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy in Vietnam for the period 1991-2004. It consists of four variables: 
industrial output, consumer price index, total liquidity, and nominal exchange rate 
between the US dollar and Vietnamese dong. All variables are considered endogenous in 
this VAR model. In their model, Pham and Vo (2005) assume that the SBV influences 
output and price by changing money supply. Due to the reforms in Vietnam's banking 
system and changes in the implementation of monetary policy during this period, they 
divide their analysis into two periods: 1991-8 and 1999-2004. The estimation results for 
the first period seem to follow theory: monetary loosening represented by an increase in 
Circular No.Ol/1999-TT dated 29/01/1999 on reducing the Vietnam dong interest rate offered by SOCBs 
to customers in urban areas and Circular No.04/1999-TT dated 23/08/1999 on implementing Government 
resolution No.08/1999/NQ-CP on measures to execute the main tasks of 1999. 
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monetary aggregate leads to increases in output and prices, and a depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate. 
In the period 1999-2004, Pham and Vo (2005) find that an increase in money supply led 
to decreases in output and prices, and an appreciation of the exchange rate in 8 to 10 
months after the increase in monetary supply. After that, output and prices increase, and 
exchange rate depreciates. Thus, Pham and Vo conclude that in the months after the 
increase in money supply, the responses of output, prices and exchange rate are not 
consistent with theory. Interest rate is not included in this model, thus it is not known 
whether the "liquidity puzzle" occurs in that period. 
It could be that the deregulation process that occurred in this period affected the 
measurement and depth of monetary aggregates. First, this was due to the rapid 
deepening level of monetization in the Vietnamese economy with the share of banking 
credit increasing as a proportion of GDP from 32 per cent in 1998 to nearly 60 per cent in 
2004^^. Second, was the increase in the number of commercial banks and non-bank 
financial institutions (financial companies, insurance companies, leasing companies, 
postal saving, and security companies)^^ and the increasing competition in traditional 
products, such as deposits and credit, as a result of interest rate deregulation (IMF, 2003). 
Third the product range offered was extended to those such as credit cards, mortgages. 
Author 's calculations. 
^^  The data on monetary aggregate for 1998 comprise four state-owned commercial banks and 24 non state-
owned banks. Data on some banks and credit institutions are not covered in the monetary aggregate. Thus, 
data from 1999 onwards comprise six state-owned commercial banks and 83 non-state credit institutions. 
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credit lines, convertible bonds and foreign exchange services (WB 2002). Thus it is 
possible that the assumption that the SBV followed a monetary targeting policy in this 
period might not be appropriate. 
When the interest rate (deposit rate) is used in the model instead of money supply as a 
proxy for changes in monetary policy, Pham and Vo (2005) examine the responses of 
other variables to an increase in the interest rate and find that money supply decreases 
permanently as expected but output and prices decrease for a few months and then 
increase permanently. Thus, the "price puzzle" does occur in the long run. The nominal 
exchange rate depreciates initially and then appreciates. Thus, Pham and Vo view the 
exchange rate impact as contrary to theory. Although the exchange rate is considered as 
endogenous in the model, Pham and Vo do not consider the exchange rate shock in their 
modeP^. Overall, they conclude that the results for the period 1999-2004 show that the 
responses of the variables in their model seem not to be consistent with accepted theory. 
4.3 Data for the model 
This thesis sets up and analyzes a recursive model for monetary transmission in Vietnam 
as a basis for research. This study also analyzes the impact of monetary policy on the 
Vietnamese economy after the Asian financial crisis, but with some notable differences 
from the model used by Pham and Vo (2005). First, the US dollar interest rate in Vietnam 
is included in the model as a proxy for the impact of the world economy on Vietnam's 
economy and on the dollarisation situation in Vietnam. The movements of US dollar 
The reason for that might be because Vietnam follows a pegged exchange rate regime as has been 
explained in Chapter 3 (section 3.3). 
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interest rate play a crucial role in monetary policy decision making of the In the 
research period 1999-2006, the trends in Vietnamese dong interest rates and domestic US 
dollar interest rates are different. Therefore, it is reasonable to differentiate the impact of 
interest rates on the economy. Figure 4.1 shows the movements of Vietnamese dong and 
US dollar interest rates in the period 1999-2006. 
Figure 4.1: Movements of Vietnamese dong and domestic 
US dollar interest rates, 1999-2006 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
• RVND — RUSD 
Note: The left hand side axis is interest rate in percent. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Second, because of significant dollarization in Vietnam, the movements of foreign 
currency deposits and Vietnamese Dong (VND) total liquidity will be differentiated. 
Because there is no data on the amount of foreign currencies circulating as cash outside 
the banking system, the amount of foreign currency deposits in the banking system is 
considered as a proxy for dollarisation. Third, the exchange rate is considered as 
The SBV has acknowledged this practice in several quarterly and annual reports. 
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exogenous in the model because the fluctuation of nominal exchange rate is under the 
close scrutiny and control of the SBV^'. The nominal exchange rate is allowed to trade in 
a -/+ 0.25 per cent trading band around the official exchange rate stipulated by the SBV 
(SBV 2005). In the research period 1999-2006, the nominal exchange rate depreciated on 
average only 1.3 percent per annum. Overall, the objective of this research is to illustrate 
and quantify the magnitude and the timing of the effect of different monetary policy 
shocks on output and prices. 
Taking into account the availability of data and the condition of the Vietnamese 
economy, our model contains the following variables: 
Interest rates: the average 3-month Vietnamese Dong deposit rate (RVND) is used as a 
proxy for market interest rate. The data are sourced from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database line 601. The 3-month US dollar deposit rate (RUSD) offered by 
the Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam is used as a proxy for the domestic US dollar rate. 
Monetary aggregate: broad money which is considered as a proxy for monetary aggregate 
is the sum of data in line 34 (usually referred to as Ml) , line 35 (Quasi-money), and line 
26 (bond and money market instruments) in the IFS database. Data on foreign currency 
deposits are from line 25b in the IFS database and are a component of Quasi-money. 
' ' If the nominal exchange rate is considered as an endogenous variable in the model, its movements after a 
shock to other variables such as interest rate or monetary aggregate are unrestricted. This response of 
exchange rate contradicts to the real situation of Vietnam in the research period. 
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Broad money is divided into Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate (VND) and foreign 
currency deposits (FCD). 
Consumer price index (CPI): is a monthly index with base year 1994 as 100. Data are 
from the CEIC database and the Vietnam General Statistical Office. 
Output (Y): because the quarterly data for Vietnam GDP is available in recent years, 
industrial production is used as a proxy for output in period 1999-2006. Data for the real 
industrial output are from the CEIC database and the Vietnam General Statistical Office 
using constant price. The GDP data for period 2001-6 are from Vietnam General 
Statistical Office using constant price. 
The nominal exchange rate (EX) is defined as end of period exchange rate of Vietnamese 
dong per 1 US dollar, from IPS database. 
All variables are used in logarithm form except interest rates. The analysis is estimated 
using the quarterly data from 1999.2 to 2006.4 giving a total of 31 observations. All 
variables are adjusted for seasonality. 
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4.4 Recursive structural VAR model (Model 1) 
This section firstly explains what restrictions apply to the recursive VAR model. The 
details of the VAR approach, including the explanation of a primitive form, reduced 
form, the stability of VAR model, the ways to identify restrictions in the primitive 
system, the derivations of the impulse response function and variance decomposition, are 
presented in Appendix A. l . Second, the optimal lag length or the order of the VAR 
model and the stability of the model are analyzed. Third, diagnostic tests of each equation 
of the VAR model are investigated. Finally, the results of VAR estimation using a 
recursive assumption including impulse response functions and variance decomposition 
are discussed. 
In our recursive VAR model, the ordering of variables is: Output (Y), prices (CPI), 
Vietnamese dong broad money (VND), foreign currency deposits (FCD), interest rate on 
Vietnamese dong deposits (RVND) and interest rate on US dollar deposit (RUSD). In 
addition to a constant, the VAR model also contains the nominal exchange rate (EX) to 
control for the gradual devaluation of the pegged exchange rate in this period. 
The ordering of the variables in our recursive VAR model follows the argument proposed 
by Bernanke and Mihov (1998): Non-policy variables (output and prices) come first and 
then policy-related variables (monetary aggregate, interest rate, exchange rate). The 
order reflects implicit assumptions about the dynamic structure of Vietnam's economy. 
Namely, industrial output is not affected contemporaneously by shocks to other variables 
in the system. Prices are influenced contemporaneously by changes in output. However, 
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both output and prices are not contemporaneously affected by a shock to policy-related 
variables within the same period. Changes in output and prices lead to changes in 
monetary aggregates of both Vietnamese dong and foreign currencies. Because the 
Vietnamese dong is the main currency for transactions in Vietnam, Vietnamese dong 
monetary aggregate is assumed to respond first to changes in output and prices. Then, 
foreign currency monetary aggregate, represented by foreign currency deposits, is 
affected by changes in output, prices and domestic monetary aggregate. 
In light of the changes in output, prices and conditions in the money market, the SBV 
could determine interest rates of domestic currency and US dollar deposits by using direct 
or indirect monetary instruments. Changes in the monetary aggregates and interest rates 
are assumed to impact on output and prices in the next period. The SBV is also able to set 
the pegged exchange rate and defend it in the short term. 
The objectives of SBV monetary policy to stimulate output or control inflation depend on 
the specific circumstance of the economy at that time and Vietnamese government policy 
in that period. Because the central bank in Vietnam is under the control of the 
government the central bank is not absolutely independent in its operation. Although the 
government and central bank might have announced the objectives of their operations in 
certain periods to the public, the timing and magnitude of central bank actions to achieve 
those objectives are still considered as shocks to the public. 
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4.4.1 Restrictions of the recursive structural VAR model 
Table 4.1 shows the recursive VAR identification for the Vietnamese economy proposed 
in this research. 
Table 4.1: Vietnam-Recursive identification of VAR system 
Equation (10) 8t = Boet can be written as: 
1 EY "bn 
2 ECPI b2i b22 
3 EVND = b3i b32 b33 
4 EFCD b4i b42 b43 b44 
5 GRVND bsi b52 b53 b54 bss 
6 GRUSD b6i b62 b63 b64 b65 
Note: Coefficients on the main diagonal of matrix Bo equal 1. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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ey 
ECPI 
EVND 
EPCD 
CRYND 
CRUSD 
These assumptions might be reasonable and consistent with actual behavior of the 
Vietnamese economy. Firstly, firms do not change their output and prices unexpectedly 
in response to unanticipated changes in monetary policy within the same period due to 
adjustment costs and planning delays while the SBV could set monetary policy quickly in 
response to development in output and prices. This assumption is reasonable because the 
SBV could implement monetary policy in the framework given by the National General 
Assembly to assist the economy to achieve certain targets in output and inflation. Thus, 
both output and prices do not react to changes in financial variables contemporaneously. 
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Furthermore, changes in the level of output commonly affect changes in price level. 
Hence, prices are assumed to respond to output immediately. 
Secondly, the changes in prices and output lead to changes in demand and supply of 
monetary aggregates in the economy. In this model, the monetary aggregate equations for 
Vietnamese dong and foreign currencies, based on money demand, are represented by 
equations in lines 3 and 4 in Table 4.1. The monetary aggregate equations, based on 
money supply, are represented by equations in lines 5 and 6 in Table 4.1. In this recursive 
VAR model, it is assumed that the SBV has contemporaneous information on output and 
prices when setting its monetary policy^^. 
Thirdly, as Vietnam follows the pegged exchange rate regime with the US dollar and 
maintains capital control, the SBV could set the domestic interest rate relatively 
independently from world levels (US Federal Fund Rate in this case). Because 
commercial banks have to maintain reserve requirements for their foreign currency 
deposits, the SBV could influence the domestic US dollar interest rate and the level of 
foreign currency deposits in the banking system by adjusting the reserve requirement 
ra t io" . However, the room for the SBV to manipulate the domestic US dollar rate is 
limited when the US Federal Reserve lowers the Federal Fund Rate. The shocks to 
domestic US dollar interest rate may come from the SBV or the US Federal Reserve 
actions. 
" This assumption will be relaxed in the non-recursive VAR model presented in Section 4.5. 
" The SBV could also influence the domestic US dollar interest rate by adjusting the ceiling interest rates 
regarding foreign currency deposits applied to legal entities. This control of interest rate is removed in 
March 2007. 
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4.4.2 Lag length and the stability of the VAR system 
The unit root test finds that most variables are 1(1), that is, non-stationary in levels but 
stationary in first differences. Definition, sources and results of the unit root test of all 
variables are presented in Appendix A.2. 
The question of choosing between a VAR estimation in first differences or in levels has 
been discussed in some previous studies. Brischetto and Voss (1999) mention that there is 
a trade-off between the loss of information about the dynamic relationships in the data 
when the VAR is estimated in first differences, and the loss of efficiency when the VAR 
is estimated in levels. Sims et al (1990) show that while an estimation of VAR in levels 
may provide efficiency loss, its parameters are estimated consistently by least squares. 
Furthermore, a VAR in first differences provides no information on the relationships 
between levels of the variables in the VAR system, and this aspect of economic theory is 
usually most informative (Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul 2002). Therefore, most of the 
empirical literature using a VAR model has tended to be estimated in levels. This study 
accepts the same procedure and VAR models are estimated in levels. Table 7 shows the 
results of tests to choose the lag length of the model. 
Table 4.2 Lag length test of the VAR system 
Lag 
LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 
1 
2 
NA 6.67e-12 -8.707 -8.142 -8.530 
263.61* 3.08e-16* -18.778* -16.514* -18.069* 
29.36 8.06e-16 -18.253 -14,292 -17.012 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
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It is essential to determine the appropriate lag length of the VAR system. Several criteria 
are usually used to determine the appropriate lag length of the VAR system: the 
likelihood ratio test, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwarz criterion (SC), 
the final prediction error and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). The lag 
length of the VAR system based on lag order selection criteria (the lowest absolute 
values) is one quarter. 
The stability test of the VAR system, by considering the inverse roots of the characteristic 
AR polynomial, shows that the estimated VAR system is stable. That is, all roots have a 
modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. Thus the standard errors in the 
impulse responses in the model are valid. The normality test and serial correlation test of 
the recursive VAR system provide satisfactory outcomes (Appendix A.2). 
4.4.3 Diagnostic tests of equations in the VAR system 
Table 9 presents the diagnostic tests equations, namely normality, serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity tests of errors, as well as the RESET test of functional form for each 
equation in the VAR system. The null hypotheses have no serial correlation (errors are 
serially uncorrelated), no heteroskedasticity (variances of errors are homoskedastic), and 
no functional form mis-specification, but they normality (errors are normally distributed). 
Diagnostic tests of each equation generally provide satisfactory outcomes. The results 
show that the errors of all equations are normally distributed. This is because the null 
hypothesis of normally distributed errors cannot be rejected at the significant level. The 
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results also show most equations have no serial correlation, no heteroskedasticity, and no 
functional form mis-specification. Only the equations representing the foreign currency 
aggregate and Vietnamese dong interest rate show evidence of mis-specification. The 
reason for having mis-specification may be due to the omission of explanatory variables. 
The volume of foreign currency deposits in Vietnam's banking system and the interest 
rate of Vietnamese dong may also depend on the price of gold in the market, because in 
Vietnam gold is also widely used as an alternative means to store value and as a medium 
for transaction. The presence of functional form mis-specification may cause biased 
ordinary least square estimators. However, in the VAR system the main goal is to analyze 
the dynamic relationships among variables in the system rather than the estimation of 
parameters in any particular equation (Ender 1995). Therefore, the presence of functional 
form mis-specification in two equations in the VAR system may not be of major concern 
in this study. 
In the presence of serial correlation, the ordinary least square estimators are unbiased but 
inefficient. However, as mentioned above, the main objective of the VAR model is to 
analyze the inter-relationships among variables in the system rather than the parameter 
estimates in any particular equation. Furthermore, the stability of the VAR system 
discussed in the previous section suggests that the standard errors of the impulse 
responses, which are the keys in the VAR analysis, are valid. 
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Table 4.3 Diagnostic tests of each equation in the VAR system 
Diagnostic Test Y CPI VND FCD RVND RUSD 
Normality of JB 0.269 0.753 3.624 3.963 0.198 2.91 
Errors 0.874 0.686 0.163 0.138 0.905 0.233 
Serial correlation of F 0.0067 0.224 0.311 4.174 0.12 1.216 
errors 0.935 0.641 0.583 0.054 0.732 0.283 
LM 0.0096 0.317 0.438 4.974 0.171 1.642 
0.922 0.573 0.508 0.026 0.679 0.200 
Heteroskedasticity F 0.097 0.021 0.277 5.23 2.542 0.022 
of errors 0.757 0.886 0.602 0.03 0.122 0.883 
LM 0.104 0.022 0.295 4.705 2.495 0.023 
0.747 0.881 0.587 0.03 0.114 0.878 
Functional form F 0.006 0.574 1.764 3.227 4.123 0.332 
(RESET) 0.94 0.457 0.198 0.087 0.055 0.570 
LL 0.008 0.809 2.420 4.288 5.377 0.472 
0.927 0.368 0.119 0.038 0.021 0.492 
Note: 
1. Sample period is Q2/1999-Q4/2006. 
2. The test for normality is the Jarque-Bera test. The test for serial correlation is the Breusche-Godfrey 
serial correlation Lagrange multiplier test with one lag. The test for heteroskedasticity is the ARCH 
test. The test for specification and stability is the Ramsey RESET test with 1 fitted residual. 
3. F is F-statistics. LM is Lagrange multiplier test computed by the number of observations (T) times 
R-squared. LL is log-likelihood ratio for testing a functional form. 
4. The null hypotheses are: normally distributed errors, no serial correlation, no heteroskedasticity and 
no functional form misspecification. 
5. Italicized values are the p-values for which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
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4.4.4 Estimation results and interpretation 
This section shows the estimated impulse responses of all variables in the recursive VAR 
model to shocks in monetary policy presented by Vietnamese dong interest rate, domestic 
US dollar interest rate and Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate. A shock to a variable in 
the model not only directly affects this variable but is also transmitted to all other 
variables through the contemporaneous relationships at the period the shock occurs and 
then through the lag structure of the VAR system. The study in this section analyzes the 
impulse responses of variables in the VAR system to one-time shocks to Vietnamese 
dong interest rate, Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate, and domestic US dollar interest 
rate using the Choleski decomposition (recursive identification). After that, forecast 
variance decomposition is examined. 
4.4.4.1 Impulse responses to a Vietnamese dong interest rate shocic 
Figure 4.2 shows the responses of all variables in the VAR model to a one-time one 
percentage point increase in Vietnamese dong interest rate (for example an interest rate 
increase from 5.0 per cent to 6.0 per cent) which occurs due to the SBV (the central bank) 
tightening of monetary policy. The direct initial effect of a shock in Vietnamese dong 
interest rate on itself is shown in Figure 4.2(e). The impacts of monetary contraction on 
output, prices, Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate, foreign currency deposits and 
domestic US dollar interest rate over a 40-quarter horizon are illustrated in Figure 4.2(a), 
4.2 (b), 4.2 (c), 4.2 (d) and 4.2 (f) respectively. The continuous lines in the graph 
represent the responses of variables after the unexpected increase in Vietnamese dong 
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interest rate in period 1. The upper and lower dotted lines represent the plus and minus 
two standard error bands of the impulse responses. 
Figure 4.2 Impulse responses to a shock in the Vietnamese dong interest rate 
Figure 4.2 (a) Output Figure 4.2 (b) Prices 
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Figure 4.2 (a) indicates the effect of Vietnamese dong interest rate shock on output. Due 
to the shock to interest rate being able to influence output in the next period, in period 1 
output does not change. The influence of interest rate shock on output is strongest in the 
fourth quarter to seventh quarter after the shock (around 1.2 per cent below the base line). 
However, after that output starts to rise gradually to its pre-shock level from quarter 22 to 
quarter 25. Thus, the effect of a tightening monetary policy on output seems to be 
consistent with the theory. 
Figure 4.2 (b) illustrates the response of prices to tightening monetary policy carried out 
by the central bank. Due to the ordering of variables in the recursive VAR model prices 
are not affected by the shock in interest rate in period 1. Similar to the movement of 
output, inflation (or rate of increase of prices) decreases after a hike in interest rate. The 
result suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in Vietnamese dong interest rate reduces 
prices by a maximum of 0.8 per cent from quarter 3 to quarter 5. Then prices rise 
gradually to their pre-shock level. Thus the 'price puzzle' (prices rise initially after a rise 
in the interest rate) seems not to appear in this model. 
The Vietnamese dong interest rate shock also has impacts on domestic monetary 
aggregate and foreign currency deposits since period 2. Figure 4.2 (c) and 4.2 (d) show 
the responses of both domestic monetary aggregate and foreign currency deposits are as 
expected in the long run. The tightening policy leads to a maximum reduction in 
Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate of around 2 per cent from quarter 8"" to lO" .^ The 
rise in interest rate for the Vietnamese dong might initially induce the public to a change 
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of approximately 3 per cent of their holdings of foreign currency deposits into 
Vietnamese dong deposits between quarters 2 and 4. Expecting this substitution, 
commercial banks would need to increase their domestic US dollar rate to maintain their 
funding in foreign currencies in the short term. The contemporaneous relationship 
between the Vietnamese dong interest rate and the domestic US dollar rate in the 
recursive assumptions explains the increase in the domestic US dollar rate at the same 
period that a shock to the Vietnamese dong interest rate occurs. However, the magnitude 
of increase in the domestic US dollar interest rate (0.25 percentage point) is lower than 
the magnitude of the shock to the Vietnamese dong interest rate (1 percentage point) but 
Vietnamese dong interest rate converges to its pre-shock level faster than US dollar 
interest rate does. In the long term, because of the slowdown in the economy, banks could 
reduce their US dollar interest rate. In general, the responses of most variables are as 
expected. 
4.4.4.2 Impulse responses to a domestic US dollar interest rate shock 
Figure 4.3 shows the movements of the domestic US dollar rate and the Federal Fund 
Rate in the research period 1999-2006. The central bank of Vietnam could influence the 
domestic US dollar rate by changing the reserve requirements or imposing the interest 
rate ceiling regarding foreign currency deposits made by legal entities. There were large 
differences between domestic US dollar interest rate and Federal Fund Rate in the period 
1999-2001 as the central bank in Vietnam attempted to limit the conversion from 
Vietnamese dong into US dollar deposits in the economy in that period (SBV, 2000). 
8 1 
However, in the period 2002-06 the movement in the domestic US dollar rate generally 
follows the movements of the Federal Fund Rate. 
Figure 4.3 Movements of Federal Fund Rate and domestic US dollar interest rate 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Fed Fund Rate 
Domestic US dollar interest rate 
Note: The vertical axis is in percentage point. 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
Figure 4.4 shows the responses of all variables in the model to a one-time shock in the 
domestic US dollar interest rate (a rise of 1 percentage point). There are two reasons that 
could lead to the increase in the domestic US dollar interest rate. First, it may occur due 
to the US Federal Reserve tightening its monetary policy. Second, the central bank in 
Vietnam may raise the required reserve applied to foreign currency deposits in the 
banking system to keep the parity between Vietnamese dong interest rate and the 
domestic US dollar rate in order to limit the dollarization in the banking system and the 
fluctuations of exchange rate^"*. 
" Details on the movements of required reserve ratios for Vietnam dong and foreign currency deposits are 
presented in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3). 
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Because the figures in Figure 4.4 show the responses of all variables in the model to an 
increase in domestic US dollar interest rates which might also reflect the tightening 
conditions in the US economy and in the international markets, the responses of all 
variables should be similar to a contraction in domestic monetary policy. Due to the 
recursive assumptions in the VAR model, a shock to the US dollar interest rate occurring 
in quarter 1 only affects other variables in the next quarter. 
Figure 4.4 (a) shows the impact of a shock in the domestic US dollar rate on output. 
Output is decreased due to two factors. First, firms in Vietnam which have loans in US 
dollars have higher costs. Second, it is the effect of the US tightening monetary policy on 
the world economy in general and on Vietnam's economy in particular. The effect is 
strongest between quarter 2 and quarter 4 (a decrease by approximately 2 per cent) after 
the increase in the domestic US dollar interest rate. Thus the impact of a shock in US 
dollar interest rate on output is faster and larger than in the case of Vietnamese dong 
interest rate shock. Thereafter, output increases and return to its pre-shock level from 
quarter 28 to quarter 30. 
The responses of foreign currency deposits (Figure 4.4 (d)), domestic monetary 
aggregates (Figure 4.4(c)) and Vietnamese dong interest rates (Figure 4.4(e)) are 
generally as expected. The higher US dollar rate induces the public to transfer their 
holdings of Vietnamese dong into foreign currency deposits. The volume of foreign 
currency deposits increases by a maximum of 4 per cent between quarter 2 and quarter 4. 
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Figure 4.4 Impulse responses to a shock in the domestic US dollar interest rate 
(a rise of 1 percentage point) 
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Commercial banks also need to adjust the interest rate for Vietnamese dong to retain their 
deposits in the domestic currency. The interest rate for Vietnamese dong is lower initially 
and then induced to a maximum increase of 0.15 percentage point between quarter 3 and 
quarter 6 after the shock. The low response of the Vietnamese dong interest rate to a 
shock in the US dollar interest rate suggests that the central bank in Vietnam could have 
certain autonomy in setting interest rates for Vietnamese dong. Then the increase in 
interest rate is associated with the fall in money supply at around 1.8 per cent from 
quarter 10 to quarter 15. However, the model does not well explain the minor increase in 
domestic monetary aggregate and decrease in the Vietnamese dong interest rate in quarter 
1 to quarter 3 after the shock in the US dollar interest rate. 
Figure 4.4 (b) indicates the impact of an unexpected rise in the domestic US dollar 
interest rate on prices. The positive response of prices (approximately 0.15 per cent) from 
quarter 2 to quarter 4 might be caused by the increased firms' costs in US dollar 
borrowings. After that period, prices are persistently at around 0.5 percent under the base 
line between quarter 10 and quarter 15 as expected due to the effect of reducing demand 
in both domestic and foreign markets. Thus in the long-term, the responses of prices and 
domestic money aggregate are as expected. Because of reductions in output and prices, 
the Vietnamese dong interest rate and the domestic US dollar rate gradually decrease and 
converge to their pre-shock levels. Overall, the responses of all variables are as expected 
in the long term. 
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4.4.4.3 Impulse responses to a shock in the Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate 
The graphs in Figure 4.5 show the responses of all variables in the model to an 
unexpected increase in the Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate (an increase of 1 per 
cent) over horizon of 40 quarters, which may reflect an expansion of money supply due 
to the SBV intervention in the foreign exchange market to maintain exchange rate target 
(SBV 2005, Camen 2006)^^ This is show by the direct initial effect of the shock to the 
Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate itself in Figure 4.5 (c). 
Due to the recursive contemporaneous relationships in the model, a shock in the 
Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate has immediate impacts on foreign currency 
aggregate, Vietnamese dong and domestic US dollar interest rates. Output and prices are 
affected only in the next period after the shock. Figure 4.5 (a) describes the response of 
output. It rises in period of quarter 2 to quarter 7 after the expansion of the money supply. 
After that it gradually decreases. Output decreases by a maximum of around 0.2 per cent 
of its pre-shock level between quarter 10 and quarter 20. In the long run, output 
converges to its baseline. Thus, in this model the effect of loosening monetary policy on 
stimulating output might be short term. 
" There is current debate on the impact of the SBV intervention in i<eeping pegged exchange rate on 
inflation, especially in the first half of 2007 the SBV has bought approximately US dollar 7 billions 
(Nguyen 2007). 
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Figure 4.5 Impulse responses to a shock in the Vietnamese dong monetary 
aggregate (a rise of 1 per cent) 
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The response of prices (Figure 4.5(b)) is not as expected in theory. Prices decrease 
persistently after increases in money supply. Prices are lower than the base line of 
approximately 0.1 per cent between quarter 10 and quarter 20. It could be the case that 
firms in Vietnam which depend heavily on bank credit could operate more efficiently 
with additional credit available at lower interest rates. Thus, output could increase and 
prices decrease in this case. However, the response of price is still a 'puzzle' needing to 
be explained. 
The impact of increasing monetary supply to Vietnamese dong interest rate (Figure 
4.5(e)) is not as expected in the short term. The Vietnamese dong interest rate increases 
immediately after the shock and decreases gradually as expected to a lower level than the 
base line. An unexpected rise of 1 per cent in Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate 
causes its interest rate to fall a maximum of 0.04 percentage point between quarter 3 and 
quarter 5. In comparison to the case of shock in Vietnamese dong interest rate (in Figure 
4.2 (c) 1 percentage point increase in Vietnamese dong interest rate leads to 2 percent 
reduction in Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate) might suggest that for the SBV 
focusing on interest rate instrument maybe more effective than on manipulating 
Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate. In the long run, interest rate rises slowly to its 
pre-shock level. Thus the 'liquidity puzzle' (interest rate rise after an increase in money 
supply) seems to occur in this model in the short term although it is minor. 
The response of foreign currency deposits is difficult to explain in this model. On the one 
hand, it is expected that the volume of foreign currency deposits in the banking system 
could increase due to a decrease in Vietnamese dong interest rate leading the public to 
prefer US dollar deposits. On the other hand, the increase in output may lead the public to 
transfer a part of their foreign currency holdings into productive purposes and 
commercial banks have to increase the US dollar interest rate to retain foreign currency 
funds for their activities. However, the impact of increasing Vietnamese dong monetary 
supply on the domestic US dollar interest rate is minor. Overall, the responses of prices 
and Vietnamese dong interest rate to a shock in Vietnamese dong monetary supply is not 
well explained by the proposed recursive VAR model. 
4.4.4.4 Forecast Variance Decomposition 
While impulse response functions show the impacts of a shock to one endogenous 
variable on other variables in the VAR system, variance decomposition separates the 
variation of an endogenous variable into component shocks to the VAR system^^. Table 
4.4 presents variations in output and prices due to the innovations or shocks to itself and 
to other endogenous variables in the VAR system, for forecast horizons 1 ,6 , 12, 24 and 
40 quarters ahead. The columns provide the percentage of the variation in each variable 
caused by different shocks, with each row adding up to 100. 
Regarding the sources of output fluctuations, the estimation results show that monetary 
factors (both monetary aggregates and interest rates) explain around 10 per cent of output 
variations at a forecast horizon of 12 quarters and increase to around 14 per cent at a 24 
quarter horizon. The domestic US dollar interest rate has a large impact on output 
movements in the short term but monetary aggregates in Vietnamese dong and foreign 
The derivation of variance decomposition is presented in Appendix 1. 
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currencies have an increasing role in explaining output fluctuations over the longer 
period. 
Table 4.4 Forecast variance decomposition of recursive VAR model 
Proportion of 
forecast error Forecast 
variance for (quarters) Shocics or innovations in 
Period Y CPl VND FCD RVND RUSD 
1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Output 
6 72.2 20.5 1.2 1.1 1.4 3.5 
12 47.9 41.9 2.1 3.0 2.0 3.0 
24 37.8 48.5 5.8 3.4 1.9 2.7 
40 37.1 48.6 6.2 3.3 1.9 2.7 
Period Y CPl VND FCD RVND RUSD 
1 0.2 99.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Prices 
6 1.2 86.6 3.6 3.9 4.3 0.2 
12 0.6 84.4 5.7 4.9 3.4 0.8 
24 0.6 80.5 10.2 4.7 2.8 1.0 
40 0.6 80.0 10.6 4.7 2.9 1.0 
Note: 1. Sample period o f t h e VAR estimation is Q2/1999-Q4/2006 
2. The variance decomposition is forecast by using Cholesiii restrictions. 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
In the case of price movements, the monetary factors contribute around 13 percent of the 
movement after 12 quarters and 17.1 per cent after 24 quarters. The monetary aggregate 
in Vietnamese dong has an increasing role in explaining price movements over the longer 
period. As output and price gradually converge to their pre-shock levels, the impacts of 
monetary factors on out put and inflation only change slightly between quarter 24 and 
quarter 40. 
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It is difficult to compare the results in Table 4.1 with those in Pham and Vo (2005), 
because different models are estimated and under different time periods. Pham and Vo 
(2005) find that broad money could explain around 15 to 17 per cent of output variation 
and a maximum of 1.2 per cent of price variation in 1 to 12 quarters after the shock in 
money supply. 
4.4.5 Concluding remarks 
The recursive VAR model proposed in this paper takes into account the conditions that 
are relevant to the monetary transmission processes in Vietnam such as dollarization in 
the economy and pegged exchange rate. The reactions of most variables in the model are 
consistent with the expectations of the impact of monetary policy in the economy. The 
"price puzzle" is not found in this model when considering the central bank tightening 
monetary policy by raising interest rates for Vietnamese dong. However, there is minor 
evidence of "liquidity puzzle" and the response of price level seems not be consistent 
with theory when considering the central bank's expansionary monetary policy of 
increasing monetary supply in Vietnamese dong. This may indicate that the restrictions 
imposed by recursive assumptions on the VAR model might not fully reflect the 
dynamics of the monetary transmission process in Vietnam. In the next section the non-
recursive VAR models are investigated. 
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4.5 A non-recursive structural VAR model for monetary transmission in Vietnam 
(Mode! 2) 
To solve the "puzzles" found in recursive structural VAR models, some empirical studies 
use the non-recursive structural VAR and additional variables that may contain 
indications of future inflation such as the US Federal Fund Rate and oil price. Such 
identification schemes, used by Sims and Zha (1995) on the US, Kim and Roubini (2000) 
on G-7 countries minus the US, Brischetto and Voss (1999) on Australia and Sodsrichai 
(2006) on Thailand, have achieved some reasonable results. The "puzzles" are not 
founds in their non-recursive models and the reaction of all variables such as output, 
prices, monetary aggregates, interest rate and exchange rate seem to follow the theory. 
However, Brischetto and Voss (1999) remark that the adding of oil price does not help to 
explain the response of all variables in the VAR model in the case of net energy 
exporting countries such as Australia, Canada or the UK in Kim and Roubini's (2000) 
study. Thus, Brischetto and Voss (1999) conclude that using oil price may be unnecessary 
for assessing monetary transmission in net - energy exporting countries. 
Vietnam is also considered as a net energy exporting country in the period 1999-2006 
(MOF 2007). Furthermore, Vietnam's domestic oil price is controlled and subsidized by 
the government^^. Up to 2007 the Vietnamese government stipulates the price of petrol 
and fuel oil in the market. To keep the stipulated prices, the government can change the 
import taxes applied to petrol and fuel oil. If the reduction in taxes is not enough to 
counter the rise in import price, the Vietnam government compensates for the losses of 
" Prices of other types of energy such as gas (for production of electricity and fertilizer), coal and 
electricity, are also under the management of the Vietnamese government. 
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oil trading enterprises resulting from selling oil products at predetermined prices (MOF 
2007). For example, the subsidization provided by the Vietnam government to cover the 
losses of oil trading enterprises reached 8.700 trillion Vietnamese dong in 2006, 
equivalent to 0.9 percent of GDP (MOF 2007). Thus, the non-recursive VAR model for 
analyzing the monetary transmission process in Vietnam does not contain the oil price 
variable. 
4.5.1 Restrictions of the non-recursive structural VAR model 
In this part the paper will analyze the monetary transmission process in Vietnam by using 
a non-recursive structure as described in Table 4.5. The identification proposed in Table 
4.5 follows Kim and Roubini (2000) and Brischetto and Voss (1999) in the sense that 
there are simultaneous relationships between monetary aggregates and interest rates in 
their VAR models. 
Table 4.5 Vietnam non-recursive identification of VAR system 
St = BqC, can be written as: 
1 GY bn 
2 ecpi b2i b22 
3 evND = b3i b32 b33 b34 b35 
4 E f c d b4i b42 b43 b44 0 
5 E r v n d 0 b52 b53 0 bss 
6 ERUSD 0 0 b63 b64 b65 
Note: Coeff icients on the main diagonal of matrix Bq are 1. 
Source: Auti ior 's calculations. 
b46 
J66 
e y 
ecpi 
evND 
epcD 
c r v n d 
CRUSD 
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The ordering of variables represents tlie assumptions about the dynamic structure of 
Vietnam's economy. Similar to the recursive VAR structural model, in the non-recursive 
VAR model output and prices are not affected contemporaneously by changes in 
financial variables. The price level is assumed to react to changes in output immediately. 
In this model, the monetary aggregate equations (line 3 and line 4 in Table 4.5) are based 
on money demand. The demand for Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate is assumed to 
depend contemporaneously on output, price level, the current demand for foreign 
currency and the interest rate of Vietnamese dong. The demand for foreign currency 
depends on output, price level, the current demand for Vietnamese dong monetary 
aggregate and domestic interest rate of the US dollar. 
The central bank is assumed to set interest rates after observing the current conditions in 
financial markets and the price level. Output is assumed not to be available at the time 
monetary policy is set due to information delay. Because the central bank in Vietnam 
could influence the domestic US dollar interest rate and the level of foreign currency 
deposits in the banking system by adjusting the reserve requirement ratio in favor of 
Vietnamese dong, the Vietnamese dong interest rate is assumed not to depend 
contemporaneously on the level of foreign currency deposits (line 5). The domestic US 
dollar interest rate is assumed not to depend on the current condition of price level 
because the main objective of the central bank in setting the domestic US dollar interest 
rate is to limit the degree of dollarization in the economy (SBV 2000). Furthermore, if we 
consider shocks to the domestic US dollar interest rate which derive from the action of 
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the US Federal Reserve, it would be reasonable to have this assumption. However, the 
domestic US dollar rate is assumed to be affected by shocks on all financial variables in 
the model (line 6). 
It should be noted that the assumed restrictions mentioned here are only applied to the 
first period when a shock to an endogenous variable in the VAR system occurs. In the 
second period and thereafter, all variables freely interact with each other. 
4.5.2 Estimation results and interpretation 
Table 4.6 Identifying test of non-recursive VAR model 
EY 1 ey 
ECPI 0.0058 1 ecpi 
Evnd = 17287 -237196 1 -65950 -108.7 evND 
£fcd 0.343 12.827 8.88 1 0 -0.057 epcD 
Srvnd 0 22.513 -1.65 0 1 0 Crvnd 
Grusd 0 0 2.22 2.80 -0.269 1 crusd 
Log likelihood = 291.59 LR test for over-identification: Chi-square (1) = 0.142 Probability = 0.7066 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
The VAR system is over-identified (only 14 restrictions). The convergence of the 
restriction matrix and the result of the test for over-identification suggest that the 
restrictions are valid. The impulse responses of all variables in this section are derived 
from structural decomposition of matrix Bo in Table 4.6. 
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4.5.2.1 Impulse responses to a shock in the Vietnamese dong interest rate 
Figure 13 shows the responses of all variables in the VAR model to a one-time 
unexpected increase of 1 percentage point in the Vietnamese dong interest rate which 
occurs due to the central bank tightening its monetary policy. The continuous green lines 
in the graphs represent the point estimate responses of variables in the model. The dotted 
red lines represent the plus or minus two standard error bands for the variables. 
It is noted that the standard error bands are very wide and in most cases encompass zero 
(the base line) for the whole of the response. This happens because of the 
contemporaneous interdependence between monetary aggregates and interest rates. Other 
studies on monetary transmission using non-recursive assumptions also observe similar 
large standard error bands^^. However, the focus of the analysis should be on the point 
estimates rather than the standard error bands themselves as these provide the best guide 
to this type of model 's responses (Brischetto and Voss 1999). 
^^  In assessing the impulse responses Brischetto and Voss's (1999) study on Australia uses 90 per cent 
confidence intervals, Sodsrichai's (2006) study on Thailand uses two standard error bands, and in most 
cases the impulse responses are statistically insignificant. Kim and Roubini (2000) study on G7 countries 
minus the US use one standard error bands so the impulse responses are statistically significant in some 
cases. 
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Figure 4.6 Impulse responses to an unexpected increase in the Vietnamese dong 
interest rate (a rise of 1 percentage point) 
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Figure 4.6 (a) indicates the impact of a rise in Vietnamese dong interest rate on output. 
The reaction of output in general is as expected. Overall, a 1 percentage point increase in 
the Vietnam dong interest rate causes domestic output to fall approximately 1.4 per cent 
below the base line between quarter 4 and quarter 8 before slowly dissipating. The 
magnitude of output response to a 1 percentage point rise in interest rate of domestic 
currency is larger than the case of the recursive model (output drop by 1.2 per cent) but 
the movement of output is similar. 
The responses of prices as presented in Figure 4.6 (b) are as expected. Prices fall to a 
maximum of approximately 0.8 per cent between quarter 3 and quarter 8 after the shock 
in interest rate. Then price level gradually increases and converges to its pre-shock level 
in the long run. The 'price puzzle' (prices rise initially after an unexpected increase in 
interest rate) seems not to occur in the model. 
The impacts of a Vietnamese dong interest rate increase on foreign currency deposits and 
domestic US dollar interest rate are described in Figure 4.6 (d) and 4.6 (f)- The domestic 
US dollar interest rate rises immediately by nearly 0.3 percentage point after monetary 
contraction. Due to the increase of the Vietnamese dong interest rate, the public is 
induced to convert part of their foreign currency deposits to Vietnamese dong deposits. 
The volume of foreign currency deposits is then able to fall slightly right after the shock 
and reaches a maximum of 3 per cent from quarter 2 to quarter 4. It is possible that 
commercial banks may have to raise the domestic US dollar rate to maintain foreign 
currency funds for their operations. 
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The conversion into Vietnamese dong might prompt the central bank to buy US dollars 
and sell Vietnamese dong to keep the pegged exchange rate. Thus the Vietnamese dong 
monetary aggregate (Figure 4.6 (c)) rises slightly after the shock in the Vietnamese dong 
interest rate. However, in the long run, the Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate 
decreases as expected by approximately 2 percent. Due to the reduction in output, interest 
rates in both the US dollar and Vietnamese dong gradually decrease and converge to 
baseline in the long run. Overall, the responses of all variables in the model are well 
defined. 
4.5.2.2 Impulse responses to a shock in the domestic US dollar interest rate 
The graphs in Figure 4.7 show the reactions of all variables to a one-time unexpected 
increase of 1 percentage point in the domestic US dollar rate. In the recursive model, a 
shock to the US dollar interest rate only exerts its impact on monetary aggregates and the 
Vietnamese dong interest rate in the next period after the shock. However, in this model, 
the non-recursive assumptions allow the Vietnamese dong interest rate as well as 
Vietnamese dong and foreign currency monetary aggregates to be affected in the same 
period that the shock in the US dollar rate occurs. The interactions between monetary 
variables in the first period explain the large standard error bands in the non-recursive 
model in comparison with the recursive model^^. 
" Brischest to and Voss (1999) o f fe r similar arguments to explain the wide standard error bands in the 
impulse responses in their non-recursive V A R models . 
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Figure 4.7 Impulse responses to an unexpected increase of domestic 
US dollar interest rate 
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The responses of all variables in this non-recursive V A R model appear to be well 
explained. Figure 4.7 (a) indicates the response o f domestic output after the shock in the 
US dollar interest rate. Output is only affected by the shock in the domestic US dollar 
interest rate since the second period. Due to a slowdown in the world economy 
(represented by the US) or the central bank in Vietnam tightening monetary policy 
regarding foreign currencies, output decreases as expected. However, in the long run 
output rises and converge to its pre-shock level between quarter 26 and quarter 30. 
The response o f prices (Figure 4.7(b)) is similar to the impact we observe in the recursive 
model. Price levels are persistently lower after the increase in the US dollar interest rate 
and drop to a maximum of nearly 0.5 per cent lower than their pre-shock levels between 
quarter 10 and quarter 13. 
Figure 4.7 (e) shows the response of the Vietnamese dong interest rate is as expected. The 
rise in the domestic US dollar interest rate may induce the public to increase their 
holdings of foreign currency deposits (Figure 4.7(d)). Thus, commercial banks in 
Vietnam need to increase the Vietnamese dong interest rate in order to keep their funding 
in the domestic currency. The delay and low response of the Vietnamese dong interest 
rate indicates that the central bank in Vietnam may have a certain degree of independence 
in deciding domestic monetary policy. 
The effect on Vietnamese dong money aggregate (Figure 4.7 (c)) is not as well specified 
as in the case of the recursive V A R model. It increases approximately 0.8 per cent after 
the shock in the US interest rate and then gradually decreases. It is possible that the 
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substantial deregulation Vietnam's financial sector has experienced in this period has 
affected the relationship between interest rates and monetary aggregates. This evidence 
can be found in the previous literature on other countries. Brischetto and Voss (1999) in 
their non-recursive VAR model on Australia also observe this effect. They explain that 
the difficulties may be associated with modeling money demand arising from the 
structural changes in the research period. To support that argument, Valadkhani et al 
(2005) find that the timing of structural breaks for various monetary aggregates and 
interest rates in Australia coincide with important policy changes during the period of 
financial deregulation starting in the 1980s. Kim and Roubini (2000) in their study on G7 
countries minus the US also observe similar responses of monetary aggregate and 
domestic interest rate in some countries. 
The reductions in output and prices may lead to a decrease in interest rates of Vietnamese 
dong and foreign currencies. As a result, in the long run, the reactions of all variables 
after the shock in the US dollar interest rate are as expected. 
4.5.2.3 Impulse responses to a shock in the Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate 
The graphs in Figure 4.8 show the responses of all variables in the VAR model to a one 
per cent increase in Vietnamese dong money supply which might occur due to the SBV 
intervention in the foreign exchange market to maintain exchange rate target (SBV 2005, 
Camen 2006). The initial direct impact of the unexpected rise in money supply on itself is 
described in Figure 4.8 (c). As has been explained previously, large standard error bands 
of impulse responses are the result of non-recursive assumptions. 
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Figure 4.8 Impulse responses to an unexpected increase in 
the Vietnamese dong money aggregate 
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Note: The vertical axes in Figure 4.8 (a), 4.8 (b), 4.8 (c) and 4.8 (d) are in per cent, and in Figure 4.8 (e) 
and 4.8 (f) they are in percentage point. The horizontal axes are in quarters. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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The responses of all variables in the non-recursive V A R model are as expected. The 
loosening of monetary policy leads to more persistent increase in output (Figure 4.8(a)) 
than in the case o f recursive V A R model (in Figure 4.5(a) output only increase from 
quarter 2 to quarter 6 after the shock in Vietnamese dong money aggregate). The effect is 
strongest from quarter 5 to quarter 9 after the increase in Vietnamese dong money supply. 
However, after that output gradually decreases and converges to its pre-shock level in 25 
quarter-horizons. 1 
Prices (Figure 4.8(b)) are also higher for a prolonged period after the increase in 
Vietnamese dong money supply. The impact on prices is strongest from quarter 5 to 
quarter 10 after the monetary shock at nearly 0.8 per cent. After that period, prices slowly 
decrease and converge to their pre-shock levels since quarter 20. Thus, the abnormal 
response of price level which exists in the recursive V A R model (Figure 15b: Prices 
decrease for a prolonged period after the increase in Vietnam dong money supply) is not 
found in the non-recursive V A R model. 
The Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate remains at a higher level for a long period. The 
Vietnamese dong interest rate decreases a maximum of 0.2 percentage point after the 
monetary shock and gradually rises to its pre-shock level due to the increase in economic 
activity and prices. Hence, the 'liquidity puzzle' (interest rate rise after an increase in 
money supply) does not occur in the non-recursive V A R model. Also the impact of an 
unexpected increase of Vietnamese dong money supply on its interest rate is larger than 
in the case of recursive V A R model (in Figure 4.5 (e) Vietnamese dong interest rate drop 
by 0.04 percentage point). 
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The explanations for responses of foreign currency deposits and domestic US dollar 
interest rates are similar to the case in the recursive VAR model. The increase of 
economic activity might induce the public to withdraw part of their foreign currency 
deposits for consumption and production purposes. Thus, banks have to raise the 
domestic US dollar interest rate by around 0.2 percentage point to maintain foreign 
currency funds for their activities. Overall, the responses of all variables in the model 
appear to be well explained. Regarding the expansion of monetary policy by increasing 
Vietnamese dong money supply, there is no evidence of a "liquidity puzzle" and the 
response of prices is well defined in the non-recursive VAR model. 
4.5.2.4 Forecast variance decomposition 
Table 4.7 presents variations in output and prices due to the innovations or shocks to 
themselves and to other endogenous variables in the VAR system, for forecast horizons 1, 
6, 12 and 24 quarters ahead. The columns provide the percentage of the variation in each 
variable caused by different shocks, with each row adding up to 100. 
Regarding the sources of output fluctuations, the estimation results show that monetary 
factors (both monetary aggregates and interest rates) explain around 10 per cent of output 
variations at forecast horizon of 12 quarters and 14 per cent at forecast horizon of 24 
quarters. Output movements are more closely related to the fluctuations in prices than 
monetary factors. 
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Table 4.7 Forecast variance decomposition of the non-recursive VAR model 
Proportion of 
forecast error Forecast 
variance for (quarters' 
Period Output Prices VND FCD RVND RUSD 
1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Output 6 72.4 20.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 3.2 
12 48.0 41.6 2.7 2.6 2.0 3.0 
18 39.9 47.5 2.7 4.9 2.0 3.0 
24 37.9 48.2 2.6 6.4 1.9 2.9 
40 37.2 48.3 2.6 6.8 2.0 2.9 
Period Output Prices VND FCD RVND RUSD 
Prices 
1 0.3 99.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 1.4 86.5 2.8 4.6 4.4 0.3 
12 0.7 84.3 3.3 6.7 3.1 1.2 
18 0.6 82.1 3.0 9.7 3.0 1.5 
24 0.6 80.4 2.9 11.4 3.0 1.5 
40 0.6 80.0 3.0 11.8 3.0 1.5 
Note: 1. Sample period o f t h e VAR estimation is Q2/1999-Q4/2006 
2. The variance decomposition is forecast by applying restrictions on the relationships between 
structural innovations and estimated errors stated in Table 4.6. 
Source: Author's calculation 
In the case of price movements the monetary factors contribute around 14 per cent of the 
movement after 12 quarters and 19 per cent after 24 quarters. Regarding monetary 
factors, interest rates of both the Vietnamese dong and US dollar have a crucial role in 
explaining price fluctuations. Unlike the recursive VAR model, in this non-recursive 
VAR model, foreign currency deposits plays a larger role than Vietnamese dong 
monetary aggregate in explaining the variations in output and prices. Overall, compared 
to the recursive VAR model, the impact of monetary factors in the non-recursive model 
on output is similar but their effects on prices are higher. 
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4.5.4 Robustness check (Model 3) 
The non-recursive VAR model is estimated with GDP data for period 2001-6. The lag 
length of the model is one quarter. The diagnostic tests of all equations generally provide 
satisfactory outcomes. The results show the errors of all equations are normally 
distributed, have no serial correlation, no heteroskedasticity and no functional form mis-
specification. The result of over-identification test confirms that the restrictions of the 
non-recursive VAR model are valid'"'. 
In this section the study focuses mainly on the impulse responses of output and prices 
only. Figure 4.9 shows the reactions of output and price level in the non-recursive VAR 
model to a one percentage point unexpected rise in the Vietnamese dong interest rate over 
a horizon of 40 quarters. 
Figure 4.9 Impulse responses to a shock in the Vietnamese dong interest rate 
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Note: The vertical axes in Figure 4.9 (a) and 4.9 (b) are per cent. The horizontal axes are in quarters. 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
"" Details of all tests of model 3 are presented in Appendix A.3. 
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Figure 4.9 (a) indicates the response of output. In the first quarter after the shock, the 
initial slight surge in output seems to be contrary to theory. Bernanke and Mihov (1995) 
give the explanation that this short-term output surge may reflect inventory accumulation 
occurring at the beginning of monetary contraction due to contract commitments. Other 
empirical studies using a non-recursive V A R model such as Sodsrichai (2006) on 
Thailand, and Kim and Roubini (2000) on G7 countries minus the US, also observe short-
term surges in output after increases in domestic interest rates. 
The response of prices shows that there is no evidence of a price puzzle. Price level is 
lower between quarter 1 and quarter 6 after a tightening monetary policy. However, the 
impacts of an interest rate shock lead to output and price level fluctuate around the 
baseline before convergence to their pre-shock levels. 
Figure 4.10 shows the responses of output and price level to an unexpected increase of 
one percentage point in the domestic US dollar interest rate. 
The impacts on output (Figure 4.10(a)) and price level (Figure 4.10(b)) are as expected. 
In the long run both output and prices return to their pre-shock levels. Overall, the 
impacts o f a rise in the domestic US dollar interest rate on output and prices are as 
postulated. 
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Figure 4.10 Impulse responses to a shock in the domestic US dollar interest rate 
Figure 4.10 (a) Output Figure 4.10(b) Prices 
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Note: The vertical axes in Figure 4,10 (a) and 4.10 (b) are in per cent. The horizontal axes are in quarters. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Figure 4.11 shows the responses of output and price level to a one per cent unexpected 
increase in domestic monetary aggregate. Output increases to a maximum of 
approximately 0.2 per cent between quarter 7 and quarter 10 after the loosening of 
monetary policy. Meanwhile, price level rises by 0.4 per cent between quarter 6 and 
quarter 8. In the long run output and prices gradually decrease. There is no evidence of a 
'price puzzle' in the model. 
The impacts of a loosening of monetary policy on output and prices in this non-recursive 
model are similar to the previous non-recursive model (Figure 4.8 (a) and 4.8 (b)) but at 
smaller magnitudes. Overall, the results of the VAR model show that the non-recursive 
assumptions proposed in this study are valid. 
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Figure 4.11 Impulse responses to a shock in the Vietnamese dong 
monetary aggregate 
Figure 4.11 (b) Prices Figure 4.11(a) Output 
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Source: Author 's calculations. 
4.5.5 Concluding remarks 
In this paper both recursive and non-recursive VAR models are investigated in order to 
analyze the monetary transmission processes in Vietnam's economy. Unlike past research 
on Vietnam, our model allows a differentiation between domestic monetary aggregate 
and foreign currency aggregate as well as domestic currency interest rate and US dollar 
interest rate in order to analyze the impact of monetary policy in a dollarized economy. 
The non-recursive VAR model seems to offer a better explanation than the recursive 
VAR model. The non-recursive VAR model is able to better explain the dynamic 
response of Vietnam's economy in the case of changing domestic monetary policy. The 
'liquidity puzzle' and 'price puzzle' are not found in the model. The absence of these 
puzzles is indirect evidence that the model appears to be suitable for analyzing monetary 
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transmission processes in the case of Vietnam in the period 1999-2006. The robustness of 
the results is checked by re-estimating using alternative variable and time periods. 
However, the proposed non-recursive V A R model still suffers from minor anomalies that 
may be caused by the financial liberalization process occurring in this period. 
Results from estimated model show that the loosening o f monetary policy that the SBV 
carried out after the Asian Financial Crisis seems to have stimulated Vietnam's economy. 
In addition, inflation and dollarisation appear to have increased as well. The finding that 
the Vietnamese dong interest rate increased by 0.2 percentage point in response to an 
unexpected increase of 1 percentage point in the domestic US dollar interest rate suggests 
that the central bank in Vietnam is still able to maintain independent monetary policy. 
Unlike past research, this study find the impact of monetary policy in the period 1999-
2006 is consistent with theory. 
I l l 
CHAPTER 5 THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL OF MONETARY 
TRANSMISSION IN VIETNAM 
5.1 Conditions for the existence of a bank lending channel in Vietnam 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 the credit channel operates through two main channels - the 
balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel. Due to the limitation of data 
available the analysis in this chapter focuses on the bank lending channel in Vietnam. 
Literature on conditions for the existence of the bank lending channel focuses on two 
assumptions (Kashyap and Stein 1993). First, is the dependence of certain groups of 
borrowers on bank lending. Second, is the power of the central bank through its 
instruments to influence the loan amounts supplied by banking sector. The existence of 
these two assumptions is determined by the structure of the financial market and its 
institutional regulation in each country. This section will analyze these assumptions in the 
case of Vietnam. 
Regarding the existence of certain groups of borrowers that heavily rely on bank loans as 
an external financial source, the prevailing situation in Vietnam is that the groups are not 
only small firms but also large firms (WB 2002). There are several reasons for this 
phenomenon. 
First, although the stock market has developed rapidly in recent years, its role as a direct 
funding source for firms is still limited. At the end of 2006, the value of the stock market 
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is equivalent of 17 per cent of GDP (Tu 2007)"*' whereas the value of total credit in the 
economy is nearly 70 per cent of GDP. Furthermore, bank credit is also a major source of 
funds to be invested in the stock market. Thus, new regulations by the SBV concerning 
stock related lending has slowed down the stock market (Lee et al 2007). 
Second, the common feature of some Vietnamese firms is that the owner's capital is 
limited and many firms need to raise external funds for their operations. Table 14 shows 
the source of funds in different type of enterprises in the period 1999-2002. All types of 
enterprises depend on external debts but the State-owned enterprises are most dependent. 
Therefore, accessing to bank credit is essential for enterprises in Vietnam. 
Table 5.] Capital resources of enterprises in Vietnam, 1999-2002, (trillion VND) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Debts Owner's 
capital 
Debts Owner's 
capital 
Debts Owner's 
capital 
Debts Owner's 
capital 
SOEs 344 250 524 223 603 218 642 252 
Non SOEs 48 35 70 43 97 64 142 95 
FDI 118 100 131 108 146 121 170 138 
enterprises 
Note: Data are end of the year numbers. 
Source: Author's calculations (from General Statistic Office industrial complete survey 2000-2003). 
The value of new funds invested in the IPOs, which relates directly to funding of firms, might be much 
lower than the market value of the stock market. The foreign indirect investment reaches US dollar 1 billion 
in 2006, equivalent of approximately 1.4 per cent of Vietnam's GDP (Ha 2007). 
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Lastly, the "lock-in effect" between borrowers and banks in Vietnam is also an important 
factor. The classification of borrowers has only been carried out recently by the Credit 
Information Center and focuses on certain groups of customers. Thus, for many firms 
switching costs might be high and maintaining long-term relationships with banks is an 
advantage. In conclusion, in the case of Vietnam, the first assumption that certain groups 
of borrowers depend on bank loans is satisfied. 
As far as the second assumption relating to the effectiveness of central bank instruments 
is concerned, Kashyap and Stein (1993) suggest some micro aspects that would break 
down the relationship between monetary policy and the amount of loans supplied as 
follows: 
1. The considerable role of the non-banking sector in providing loan to customer. 
2. The amount of bank bonds as a buffer against reserve shocks. 
3. The banks' ability to attain non-reserve funds. 
4. Existence of regulatory standards and constraints. 
Each of these aspects will be examined to justify whether the second assumptions is 
satisfied in the case of Vietnam. Regarding the first aspect, a rising concern is the 
magnitude that non-banking institutions could become an alternative source of funds for 
borrowers. As these institutions usually are not subject to reserve requirements, there is 
no direct effect on them when the central bank tightens its monetary policy. 
In Vietnam the main non-banking institutions are insurance companies and the Vietnam 
Development Bank (VDB) - a state owned policy bank. However, only certain types of 
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customers could access loans from the VDB and the total of outstanding loans of VDB as 
at the end of 2006 is VND 96 trillions, which is equivalent to approximately 14 per cent 
of that of the banking system (VDB 2007). The re-investments by insurance companies to 
the economy reach the highest volume of VND 34 trillions in 2006, which are equivalent 
to nearly 5 per cent of total bank lending volume in 2006 (MOF 2007). Given the short 
history of operations by insurance companies and regulations on investing premiums, 
insurance companies are not major lenders in the current period. Thus, firms still find it 
difficult to switch to alternative sources of finance in Vietnam. 
The second aspect is that banks could keep alternative assets (bonds and bills) rather than 
loans. When facing a tightening monetary policy, banks could sell the alternative assets to 
generate funds so they do not need to cut down their lending. Therefore, a tightening 
monetary policy affects bank lending only when banks keep a small ratio of their assets in 
bonds. Table 15 shows the asset structure of credit institutions in Vietnam in the period 
2001-6. 
Table 5.2 Asset structures of credit institutions in Vietnam, 2001-2006 (per cent) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Reserves 6.2 5.9 7.4 6 5.9 7.4 
Treasury bills. 3.4 5.1 8.2 3.2 7.7 8.3 
notes and bonds 
Foreign assets 26.7 20.8 12.3 11.1 10.1 11.4 
Credit to customers 63.6 68.2 72.1 79.5 76.2 72.8 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Table 5.2 shows that the main part of credit institution assets is credit to customers. The 
ratio of liquid assets, including Treasury note and government bonds, in total assets is 
small. As the liquidity of government bonds is quite low, therefore, banks usually keep 
them to maturity. Hence, the bank's ability to generate funds from liquid assets might be 
limited. 
Third aspect that needs to be considered is bank's ability to attract non-reserve 
requirement funds. If banks are in a position of easily being able to switch to other 
sources of funds, like certificates of deposits (CDs), to avoid the reserve requirement, the 
bank lending channel might not be effective. In general, commercial banks could raise 
non-reserve funds in the forms of CDs, equity and offshore borrowing. The two later 
forms are not easily available in Vietnam. The Vietnamese government and SBV issue 
restrictive regulations on offshore borrowing and selling bank equity to foreign residents. 
In regarding to the issuance of CDs, under the current regulation on reserve requirements, 
only CDs with terms of more than 24 months are exempt from reserve requirements. 
Furthermore, commercial banks have to obtain SBV approval for issuing CDs with terms 
of more than 12 months. As a result, in the case of monetary tightening it is difficult for 
banks to avoid cutting down loans by increasing CDs issuance. 
The last aspect is the implementation of regulatory standards and constraints. One 
example for this is the regulation of the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). Kashyap and 
Stein (1993) argue that if capital requirements imposed on loans are high, banks could 
choose to hold more bonds or other low-risk assets rather than to provide new loans that 
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subject to high capital requirements (due to high risk). Such linkages would weaken the 
impact of monetary policy through the bank lending channel because banks could avoid 
cutting down lending by adjusting their low-risk assets in the case of monetary 
contraction. In Vietnam's case, only some banks have achieved the required CAR of 8 
per cent (VET 2006). As Table 5.2 shows the ratio of bank bond holdings is small, so the 
bank lending channel is still effective. 
In summary, there is no evidence that financial structure and institutional regulations 
might break down the link between monetary policy and lending activity of the banking 
system in Vietnam. The next section will review different approaches in analyzing the 
bank lending channel and explore a VAR model of bank lending in the case of Vietnam. 
5.2 Relevant approaches on the bank lending channel 
There are some different approaches to investigating the bank lending channel in the 
literature. A standard model is suggested by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). In their 
model, the bank lending market is added into three markets (money, bonds, goods) of the 
traditional IS/LM model. The supply of loans depends negatively on the interest rate on 
bonds and positively on the interest rate on loans. The demand for loans depends 
negatively on the interest rate on loans and positively on the interest rate on bonds. 
Tightening monetary policy implies an increase in the spread between the interest on 
loans and interest of bonds in this model. In the model the spread between the interest 
rate on loans and interest rate of bonds is considered as the supply side of credit. 
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For the existence of a bank lending channel, Miron et al (1995) agree that there should be 
a widening spread between loan and bond rates during a tight monetary period. However, 
they add that after changes in monetary policy there should be evidence of changes in the 
ratio of loans to the total of loans and commercial papers. In other words, the responses 
of different types of bank asset are not equal following the monetary policy change. 
Carrasquilla (1998), Sirivedhin (1998) and Kim (1999) use this approach in recursive 
VAR models to assess the response of bank asset to monetary policy shocks. They find 
that both loans and bonds are reduced following monetary contractions but response of 
bond is quicker than that of loans. Thus, there is evidence of the existence of a bank 
lending channel. Holtermoller (2005) also uses this approach with a non-recursive VAR 
model to analyze the credit channel in Germany. He also finds strong evidence of the 
effectiveness and relevance of the bank lending channel. 
Another approach to examine the bank lending channel is proposed by Bayoumi and 
Morsink (2001), and Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2006). Specifically, the VAR 
technique is performed with the following steps. First, a basic VAR model is estimated to 
capture relationships between variables of interest on monetary transmission mechanism, 
namely output, price index and policy variables. Second, a VAR model assessing the 
interest channel is estimated. Then the credit variable will be added to the basic VAR 
model. Finally, the responses of output and prices in two latter models will be compared. 
Bayoumi and Morsink (2001) find that the bank lending channel is very important for 
non-financial private sector in Japan. Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2006) also show bank 
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lending channel enhance the impact of changes in monetary policy on output and 
inflation in Thailand. 
5.3 Recursive VAR Model for the bank lending channel (Model 4) 
5.3.1 Model specification 
Figure 5.1 shows the volumes of bank loans in Vietnamese dong and foreign currencies 
in the period 1999-2006. The largest increases occurred in 1999 when the SBV carried 
out a loosening monetary policy to stimulate the economy. The differences in growth 
rates of bank loans in VND and foreign currencies suggest that they might have different 
impacts on output and price level. Camen (2006) notes that the stable exchange rate and 
low level of US dollar interest rate also leads to higher growth rate of lending in foreign 
currency than that of Vietnamese dong in period 2003-2004. 
Figure 5.1 Volumes of foreign currency and Vietnamese dong loans, 1999-2006 
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• VND loans — ^ Foreign currency loans 
Note: The left hand side axis is in trillion VND. 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
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In this section a recursive VAR model of seven variables with same approach as 
Bayoumi and Morsink (2001), and Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2006) is used to analyze 
the bank lending channel in Vietnam"^^. The output (Y), price index (CPI), nominal 
exchange rate (EX), Vietnamese dong interest rate (RVND) and US dollar interest rate 
(RUSD) variables are the same as in Chapter 4. Two new variables are volumes of 
Vietnamese dong credit (VNDLOAN) and foreign currency credit (FCLOAN). Data of 
Vietnam dong credit and foreign currency credit are from IPS database and State Bank of 
Vietnam. All variables are used in logarithmic form except for the interest rate. The 
analysis is estimated using quarterly data from 1999.2 to 2006.4 giving a total of 31 
observations. All variables are checked and adjusted for seasonality. 
Table 5.3 shows the recursive VAR identification for assessing bank lending channel in 
Vietnam. 
Table 5.3 Recursive VAR model for the bank lending channel in Vietnam 
1 EY b „ 
2 ECPI b2i b22 
3 SRVND = b3i b32 b33 
4 GRUSD b4i b42 b43 b44 
5 EVNDLOAN b52 b53 b54 b55 b56 
6 SFCLGAN b6i b62 b63 b64 b65 b66 
ey 
ecpi 
CRVND 
CRUSD 
EVNDLOAN 
EPCLGAN 
Source: Author's calculations. 
The approach proposed by Bemanke and Blinder (1998) is not investigated due to the limitation on data 
and the recent development of the bond market in Vietnam. 
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In our VAR model, the ordering of variables is: Output (Y), prices (CPI), Vietnamese 
dong interest rate (RVND), domestic US dollar interest rate, credit in Vietnamese dong 
(VNDLOAN) and credit in foreign currencies (FCLOAN). The ordering of the variables 
reflects implicit assumptions on the dynamic structure of the bank lending channel. 
Output is not affected contemporaneously by shocks to prices, interest rates, supply and 
demand of bank credit. Prices are influenced contemporaneously by changes in output. 
Interest rates are affected by changes in prices and in output contemporaneously. Bank 
credit is affected contemporaneously by changes in other variables in the model. Because 
the lending interest rates on both Vietnamese dong and foreign currency loans have been 
gradually deregulated since August 2000 the interest rates used in this model are short-
term deposits rates, which have been deregulated since late 1996'* .^ Therefore, these rates 
may better reflect the changes in the SBV's monetary policy and conditions in the money 
market. 
Figure 5.1 shows that volumes of bank loans in foreign currencies were around 20 to 25 
per cent of the total bank loans in the period 1999-2006. As the SBV also applied 
regulations to limit the use of foreign currency loans, therefore, VNDLOAN variable 
comes before FCLOAN variable in the model. 
The lag length of the VAR model is two quarters, based on several criteria. The 
diagnostic tests of all equations generally provide satisfactory outcomes. The results 
" Details o f the process of deregulation of interest rates in Vietnam are presented in Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
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show the errors of all equations are normally distributed, have no serial correlation, no 
heteroskedasticity and no functional form mis-specification'^'*. 
The stability test of the VAR model shows that the VAR is stable. Thus the impulse 
responses are valid. The VAR model is estimated with recursive assumptions (Choleski 
decomposition). 
5.3.2 Estimation results and interpretation 
The study in this section analyzes the impulse responses of variables in the VAR system 
to one-time shocks to Vietnamese dong interest rate, domestic US dollar interest rate, 
Vietnamese dong monetary aggregate and foreign currency loans. After that, forecast 
variance decomposition is examined. 
5.3.2.1 Impulse responses to a shock in the Vietnam dong interest rate 
The graphs in Figure 5.2 show the responses of all variables in the system to a one-time 
unexpected increase in the Vietnamese dong interest rate of one percentage point in a 
horizon of 45 quarters. Figure 5.2 (c) indicates the response of Vietnamese dong interest 
rate to an unexpected rise in itself After the shock, the Vietnamese dong interest rate 
decreases and stabilizes from the quarter 10. 
Following the monetary contraction, Vietnamese dong loans are reduced by nearly 2 per 
cent (Figure 5.2 (e)). Between quarter 5 and quarter 12 after the shocks, volume of VND 
bank lending is decreased by 5 per cent. 
' Details of the specific tests o f each equation are presented in the Appendix A.4. 
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Figure 5.2 Impulse responses to a shock in the Vietnamese dong interest rate 
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Source: Author 's calculations. 
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The reduction in bank lending affects output and price level until quarter 15 to quarter 20 
after the shocks (Figure 5.2 (a) and 5.2 (b)). Output decreases from the third quarter after 
the shock in interest rate. The initial surge of output might reflect contract commitments 
in the economy (Bernanke and Mihov 1995). However, since quarter 20 after the shock -
due to the lower interest rate in Vietnamese dong and US dollar - bank lending in V N D 
and USD, output and price level all increase. 
Compare to the impact of V N D interest rate on output in V A R models presented in 
Chapter 4 (Figure 4.2 (a) and 4.6(a)), the impact on output and prices in the bank lending 
channel is larger and is less persistent. 
The increase in the Vietnamese dong interest rate may induce the public to prefer V N D 
deposits to USD deposits. Thus banks need to raise their USD interest rate of 
approximately 0.35 percentage point (Figure 5.2 (d)). The lending in foreign currencies is 
lower, as expected (Figure 5.2 (f)). The drop of nearly 10 per cent in foreign bank lending 
might derive from higher US dollar lending rate and slow down in the economy. As a 
result of slowdown in economic activity and lower bank lending volume, the USD 
interest rate decreases by 0.4 percentage point from the base line from quarter 5 to quarter 
15 after the shock in V N D interest rate. Then, the lower USD interest rate could induce 
higher foreign currency borrowing and increases in output and price level. The response 
of USD interest rate is similar to its reactions in the V A R models in Chapter 4. Overall, 
the responses of all variables in the model are well explained. 
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5.3.2.2 Impulse responses to a shock in the domestic US dollar interest rate 
Figure 5.3 describes the reactions of all variables to an unexpected increase in the 
domestic USD interest rate by 1 percentage point. The responses of output (Figure 5.3(a)) 
and prices (Figure 5.3(b)) are similar for the case of an unexpected rise in VND interest 
rate. Due to the recursive assumption of the VAR model, the domestic USD interest rate, 
VND bank loans and foreign currency bank loans are affected at the same time that the 
shock occurs. 
The increase in the domestic USD interest rate induces an increase in the VND interest 
rate in the short run of approximately 0.4 percentage point. Facing the higher cost of 
borrowing in USD loans, firms may prefer to borrow in VND loans (5.3(e)). Thus firms 
may choose to increase borrowing in VND in the short term. Furthermore, due to the 
sticky nature of loan agreements, the volume of Vietnamese dong loans could also 
increase from quarter 1 to quarter 3 after the unexpected rise in the domestic USD interest 
rate. From quarter 5 to quarter 15 after the shock, bank lending in foreign currency is 
decreased by nearly 10 per cent (Figure 5.3(f)). As banks are induced to raise the VND 
interest rate, between quarters 4 and 15 the volume of VND loans drops by nearly 6 per 
cent. As a result of higher interest rates and reduction in bank loans, the economy slows 
down from quarter 5 to quarter 10 after the shock. From quarter 25 to quarter 40 after the 
shock, the lower interest rates, especially in VND, might induce an increase of bank loans 
and lead to higher output and prices. Thus, the responses of output and prices are as 
expected. However, the magnitude of the impact of a shock in USD interest on output and 
price in this model is bigger than in the VAR model presented in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.4 
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(a), (b) and 4.7(a), (b)). In conclusion, the reactions of all variables are as projected in this 
case. 
Figure 5.3 Impulse responses to a shock in the domestic US dollar interest rate 
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Source: Author's calculations. 
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5.3.2.3 Impulse responses to a shock in Vietnamese dong bank loans 
Figure 5.4 indicates the reactions of all variables in the model following an increase of 1 
per cent in VND bank loans. The shock to bank loans might occur as the central bank 
loosens the regulatory lending standards and commercial banks also expand lending 
activities. The increase in VND bank lending is associated with a minor reduction in 
VND interest rates between quarter 2 and quarter 5 after the shock (Figure 5.4(c)). 
However, as the demand on bank loan expands; the VND interest rate is induced to 
increase from quarter 5 to quarter 8. The initial impact of an increase in VND bank loans 
in raising output is limited in 1 to 3 quarters after the shock in bank lending. The long-run 
impact of an increase in VND bank loans on output and price level is only presented from 
quarter 20 to quarter 40. This may reflect the long lag between investment by firms and 
results of the investment. The response of prices shows a similar movement to output. 
The responses of output and prices in the model may reflect the fact that in Vietnam the 
expansion of VND bank lending implemented by the SBV in period 1999-2000 has its 
intended impact on output and prices on later period. 
As firms may choose to increase borrowing in VND, the volume of foreign currency bank 
loans is reduced. The domestic USD interest rate is also lower from quarter 5 to quarter 
28 due to the impact of the VND interest rate. As a result, foreign currency bank loans 
increase from quarter 23. Overall, the impacts in increasing in bank lending on output and 
price level are as expected but they are only observed after a long period. 
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Figure 5.4 Impulse responses to a shock in Vietnamese dong bank loans 
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Source: Author's calculations. 
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5.3.2.4 Impulse responses to a shock in foreign currency lending 
Figure 5.5 shows the responses of all variables in the model to an unexpected rise of 1 per 
cent in foreign currency lending. This shock might occur as the central bank loosens the 
regulations regarding bank lending in foreign currencies. Due to the recursive assumption 
all other variables are affected from the second quarter after the shock. Unlike the case of 
shock in VND bank loans, in this case the impacts of increasing foreign currency lending 
on output and price level are observed immediately from the second quarter. 
The increase of foreign currency loans by 1 per cent is associated with the decrease of 
0.02 percentage point in domestic USD interest rate in 2 to 4 quarters (Figure 5.5(d)). The 
higher USD interest rate of nearly 0.05 percentage point in 5 to 20 quarter might reflect 
the increasing demand for foreign bank loans by firm could lead to commercial banks to 
raise USD interest rate for both deposits and loans. Foreign currency deposits by 
households are the main source of funds in foreign currencies in the banking system 
(SBV 2000). As foreign borrowing is restricted by regulations, the usual way to increase 
funds in foreign currency for banks is to mobilize funds in the domestic market. In 
contrast, banks could increase VND funds by using refinancing or discounting facility 
offered by the SBV. The VND interest rate is lower by nearly 0.05 percentage point 
between quarter 2 to quarter 7 after the shock and leads to a maximum increase of 0.5 per 
cent in VND bank loans between quarter 10 and quarter 15. Between quarter 20 and 
quarter 40 after the shock in bank lending in foreign currencies, output, price level and 
bank lending are all lower and stabilize around the base line. Overall, the responses of all 
variables in the model are as expected. 
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Figure 5.5 Impulse responses to a shock in foreign currency bank loans 
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5.3.2.5 Variance decomposition of VAR model for the bank lending channel 
Table 15 shows the variance decomposition of output and prices. The bank credit and 
interest rate seems to play an important role in affecting the output and prices. Interest 
rates of VND and USD explain approximately 28 per cent and 40 per cent variations in 
output and prices respectively at forecast horizon of 12 quarter. Bank lending in VND 
and USD could explain over 50 per cent and 34 per cent variations in output and price 
level respectively at forecast horizon of 12 quarters. Price level is affected significantly 
by the shock to itself between quarter 1 and quarter 6. After that price level is heavily 
influenced by monetary factors. Foreign currency lending seems to have a larger role than 
VND bank lending in explaining the variations in output and price level. 
Table 5.4 Bank lending channel - Variance decomposition of output and prices 
Proportion of 
forecast error Forecast 
variance for (quarters) Shock in 
Period Output Prices RVND RUSD VNDLOAN FCLOAN 
1 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Output 
6 26.3 3.3 7.5 9.4 13.7 39.8 
12 17.8 2.0 12.5 14.8 13.6 39.2 
24 17.0 2.2 12.7 15.6 13.7 38.7 
40 16.6 2.1 13.1 16.0 13.8 38.4 
Period Output Prices RVND RUSD VNDLOAN FCLOAN 
1 28.3 71.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Prices 
6 29.8 12.5 33.2 10.4 2.8 11.4 
12 20.3 5.2 24.6 15.9 9.6 24.3 
24 16.1 3.8 21.2 18.4 11.8 28.6 
40 16.0 3.6 21.2 18.5 11.8 28.8 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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5.3.3 Robustness check (Model 5) 
The model is re-estimated using the bank lending rates in Vietnam dong and US dollars 
in the period 1999-2006. Data of bank lending rates in Vietnam dong and US dollars are 
from IFS database and State Bank of Vietnam. The lag length of the VAR model is one 
quarters, based on several criteria. The diagnostic tests of all equations generally provide 
satisfactory outcomes. The results show the errors of all equations are normally 
distributed, have no serial correlation, no heteroskedasticity and no functional form mis-
specification'*^. 
Figure 5.6 shows the responses of all variables in the model to an unexpected increase of 
1 percentage point in the lending interest rate of Vietnamese dong. The shock in the VND 
lending interest rate causes output, price level and bank lending to fall between quarter 1 
and quarter 15 or 20. However, the initial surge of output in Figure 5.6 (a) after the shock 
in the VND interest rate is more obvious than in Figure 5.2 (a). Besides, the declines in 
output, prices (Figure 5.6 (b)), VND bank loans (Figure 5.6 (e)) and Foreign currency 
banks loans (Figure 5.6 (d)) in this model are smaller than that of in Figure 5.2. In 
general, the reactions of all variables in this model are similar to responses in Figure 5.2. 
Details o f all tests o f each equation are presented in Appendix A.5. 
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Figure 5.6 Impulse responses to an unexpected increase in the VND interest rate 
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Figure 5.7 describes the reactions of all variables in the VAR model to a shock in the US 
dollar lending interest rate of 1 percentage point. 
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Figure 5.7 Impulse responses to an unexpected increase in the domestic 
US dollar interest rate 
Figure 5.7 (a) Output Figure 5.7 (b) Prices 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Figure 5.7 (c) VND interest rate 
A 
1 
1 1 
\ 
/ 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Figure 5.7 (e) VND loans 
\ 
\ 
' \ \ 
\ y \ y 
\ 
\ 
y 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Figure 5.7(d) USD interest rate 
\ 
\ \ 
,—----
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Figure 5.7 (f) Foreign currency loans 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Notes: The vertical axes in Figure 5.7 (a), 5.7 (b), 5.7 (c) and 5.7 (f) are in per cent, and in Figure 5.7 (c) 
and 5.7 (d) are in percentage point. The horizontal axes are in quarter. 
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The movement and magnitude of output, prices and bank loans in Vietnamese dong and 
US dollar reactions in Figure 5.7 are similar to their responses in Figure 5.3. The shock in 
the US dollar interest rate lead to a drop in output, prices from quarter 1 to quarter 20. 
Bank loans rise initially due to contract commitments between banks and firms. 
However, the increase in the US dollar lending interest does not induce an increase in the 
V N D lending interest rate (Figure 5.7 (c)). The gradually deregulation of bank lending 
interest rates in Vietnamese dong and foreign currencies in the period 1999 - 2003 may 
be a reason for this phenomenon'*^. Therefore, the increase of the V N D interest rate after 
a rise in the US dollar interest rate in Figure 5.3 (c) might be more reasonable. 
Figure 5.8 shows the movements of all variables after unexpected rise of 1 percent in 
bank lending in Vietnamese dong (Figure 5.8 (e)). Foreign currency loans (Figure 5.8 (f)) 
rise 0.7 per cent after the increase in V N D bank loans. As a result, the US dollar lending 
interest rate (Figure 5.8 (d)) goes up 0.01 percentage point. In contrast, the V N D lending 
interest rate (Figure 5.8 (c)) is lower by 0.02 percentage point. The increase supply of 
bank loan leads to initial surge in output (Figure 5.8 (a)) from quarter 1 to quarter 5. 
Output and prices are higher persistently than their pre-shock levels between quarter 20 
and quarter 40. In general, the responses of all variables in Figure 5.8 are similar to their 
responses in Figure 5.3 
' The deregulation process of interest rates is presented in Chapter 3 section 3.3. 
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Figure 5.8 Impulse responses to an unexpected increase in VND bank loans 
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Figure 5.9 presents the reactions of all variables in the model to an increase of 1 per cent 
in bank lending in foreign currencies. Overall, the reactions of all variables in Figure 5.9 
are similar to their responses in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.9 Impulse responses to an unexpected increase 
in foreign currency bank loans 
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5.4 Concluding remarks 
The VAR model presented in this paper attempts to analyze the bank lending channel in 
Vietnam in the period 1999-2006. Because the movement of interest rates on Vietnamese 
dong and foreign currency loans is not the same, bank lending in Vietnam is divided into 
lending in Vietnamese dong and in foreign currencies. Different type of interest rates in 
Vietnamese dong and US dollar are alternatively used in the model. The estimation 
results show that the bank lending channel does have an effect in increasing output and 
prices. The impact of changes in interest rates on output and price level is augmented 
through the bank lending channel. In the case of an unexpected increase in Vietnamese 
dong bank loans, the proposed model shows that the impacts on output and prices are 
observed only after a long period. The reason for that might be that the interest rate on 
Vietnamese dong loans was only deregulated gradually from 2001. Foreign currency 
lending seems to have a larger impact on output and prices than Vietnamese dong 
lending. The finding suggests that the loosening monetary policy implemented by the 
central bank in Vietnam could stimulate the economy but also raise the inflation. 
Overall, the proposed VAR model offers an examination of actual bank lending channel 
and enriches the knowledge of monetary transmission in Vietnam's economy in this 
period. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary of findings 
The thesis analyzes several issues relating to the monetary transmission process in 
Vietnam in period 1999-2006. First the thesis shows that since 1999 the reform in 
banking sector in Vietnam has allowed monetary policy to achieve its role in the 
economy. The relationship between dollarisation and other major economic variables, 
such as output and inflation, is also investigated in the model. Because of the 
dollarization situation in Vietnam the monetary aggregate is divided into two 
components: domestic monetary aggregates and foreign currency deposit. The domestic 
US dollar interest rate is also included in the model. However, the structural vector 
autoregressive model with a recursive assumption seems not to reflect properly the 
monetary transmission process in this period. To solve the 'puzzles' a structural vector 
autoregressive model that allows for non-recursive contemporaneous identification is 
used. The identification scheme proposed in the research appears to offer satisfactory 
results. No evidence of the 'price puzzle' or 'liquidity puzzle' is found. 
The main finding suggests that the loosening of domestic monetary policy implemented 
by the central bank after the Asian Financial Crisis did bring the expected results: output 
increased and the inflation rose as well. The interest rate appears to be the main policy 
instrument for the central bank in Vietnam. Dollarization in the Vietnam's economy also 
had an impact on the transmission process. Thus, it is necessary to consider the impact of 
the movements of foreign currency deposits in the banking system and the domestic USD 
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rate in analyzing monetary transmission mechanism. However, the impulse response o f 
Vietnamese dong interest rate after a tightening in domestic US dollar interest rate 
suggests that the central bank in Vietnam is still able to maintain independent monetary 
policy. The bank lending channel seems to enhance the impact o f changes in monetary 
policy on output and inflation. The lagged positive responses of output and price level to 
an increase in bank lending in Vietnamese dong suggest that the central bank should be 
cautious in expanding lending activity to stimulate the economy. Overall, the findings in 
this research show that impacts of monetary policy on main economic variables in the 
period 1999-2006 are consistent with theory. The findings also justify the central bank 
action after the Asian Financial Crisis to use monetary policy in stimulating the economy. 
However, this policy also raised inflation and dollarization in this period. Therefore, in 
managing monetary policy the central bank should not only pay attention to achieve 
short-term targets but also need to consider long term impacts. 
6.2 Limitations and suggestions for further studies 
Overall, the research undertaken in this thesis is subject to certain limitations, in 
particular is the data availability. The empirical results in this thesis provide some 
suggestions for the central bank in Vietnam to analyze the impacts of monetary policy. 
However, to make policy decisions in reality these results should be used carefully, 
particularly for forecasting. 
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The nonstationary of data and the use of a structural vector autoregressive model might 
be questionable although the thesis does explain that the estimation of V A R in levels still 
provides consistent estimates and using all available information. Furthermore, the 
stability o f the V A R model suggests that the estimation results as reflected in the 
impulses response analysis are valid. The convergence of all variables in the model after 
the shocks occur also supports the validity of the results. 
At this point, data on bank credit are not available in sufficient detail to investigate the 
effect of the credit channel in Vietnam following the approach proposed by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1998). Thus, future studies on the impact of credit channel in the transmission 
process using on this approach would be useful. The rapid increases in number of 
equitised firms and market value of stock exchange in Vietnam also suggest that asset 
price channel could become an important channel in monetary transmission mechanism. 
Furthermore, a comparison of the monetary transmission mechanism across economies 
which experience dollarisation and pegged exchange rate regimes could provide further 
policy implications on the issue of monetary transmission in those economies. 
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Appendix A. l Structural vector autoregression model 
A. 1.1 SVAR model 
We can express the VAR model in short forms as follow (for simplifying, intercept terms 
and exogenous variables are omitted) 
Xt = BoX, + BiX,.i + + BpXt.p + 8, (1) 
Where X, = 
>'1, 
yn, 
is an n x 1 vector of variables at time t, 
Bj for i = 0, 1,...., p are n x n matrix of coefficients, 
and St = is an n X 1 vector of structural shocks and E(e,s t) = I. 
For OLS estimation procedure (1) is modified as follows: 
( 1 - B o ) X , = B , X t . , + + B p X t . p + 8 , ( 2 ) 
Pre-multiplying with matrix (1 - Bo)"' = Ao the reduced form or standard form will be: 
X , = A , X , . i + + A p X , . p + e , ( 3 ) 
where et is the n x 1 vector of reduced form residuals with variance-covariance matrix 
E(u,u',) = Q; E(u,uj) = 0: i^j ; Ai = AoBj, for i = l , . . . . ,p. 
In order to have stability of a V A R model or to have a convergent expansion of X,, it 
requires that the roots of the system in (3) are less than one in absolute value. 
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The structural shocks and reduced form residuals are related by 
et = AoSt (4) 
a = AoA'o (5) 
(1) and (3) can be manipulated further to get: 
Xt=[ l -B(L)] - '8 t (6) 
and Xt=[ l -A(L)]" 'e t (7) 
in which: B(L)X, = BoX, + BiX,., + + BpX,.p 
A(L)X, = AiYt., + + ApYt.p 
From (4), (6) and (7) we can get the impulse to structural shocks by formulating relation: 
[1-B(L)]-' = [1-A(L)]-'AO (8) 
The variance-covariance matrix Q obtained from the estimation provide n(n+l) /2 
restrictions on AQ (equation 5) and thus, n(n-l) /2 additional restrictions are needed for 
full identification. 
Two methods have been used in the VAR literature to identify the structural shocks. The 
first one is recursive assumption that assuming AQ is lower triangular and using Choleski 
decomposition of the matrix Q. In this recursive model, shocks are transmitted between 
variables in the system in one-way restriction following the ordering of variables. The 
second method is non recursive assumption. The non-recursive approach does not require 
matrix AQ is lower triangular. Shocks to variables in the system could affect other 
variables contemporaneously. 
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A.1.2 Impulse response functions 
An important implication of VAR model is to investigate the impulse response functions 
of variables following shocks to other variables. These shocks are explained as 
exogenous changes coming from outside the model and uncorrelated with each other. 
Impulse response functions allow tracing out the time path of various shocks on variable 
interested. From (7) we can depict the impulse response functions in form of vector 
moving average as follows: 
;=0 / = 0 
•0„(/) ... e,si)' 
... e,„{i) 
e.2ii) - dn^ii). 
-It-, 
in which 8t is structural shocks, is a average value of Xt. 
The elements of 6i are called impulse response functions, plotting these elements against i 
is practical way to visually examine the behavior of Xt in response to various shocks. 
For i=0 we have 9i2(0) is the instantly impact of a one-unit change in e^it on Xu; 0ii(l) is 
one period response of a one-unit change in t-i on xu. 
A.1.3 Variance decomposition 
Variance decomposition is tool to decompose error variance of one endogenous variable 
in VAR model by its own shock against shocks of other variables. This is useful tool to 
represent which shocks significantly contribute to forecast variance of interested variable. 
Typically, over short forecast periods, the error variance of interested variable is mainly 
due to its own shock. However, over longer forecast periods, other shocks may become 
relatively important through the structure of VAR model. 
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Appendix A.2 Tests of Model 1 
Table A.2.1 Unit root test of data 
Variables 
Test for 1(0) 
(Levels) 
Test for 1(1) 
(First differences) 
Critical value 
at 1% level 
1(0) 1(1) 
Critical value 
at 5% level 
1(0) 1(1) 
Y -2.914 -6.940 -4.28 -4.29 -3.562 -3.568 
CPI -2.319 -3.680 -4.28 -4.29 -3.562 -3.568 
VND -3.459 -2.412 -4,28 -4.31 -3.562 -3.574 
FCD -6.764 -3.849 -4.394 -4.29 -3,612 -3.568 
RVND -3.956 -4.000 -4.28 -4.29 -3.562 -3.568 
RUSD -0.317 -3.178 -4.28 -4.34 -3.562 -3.587 
EX -2.116 -4.417 -4.32 -4.35 -3.580 -3.595 
Note: 
1. Unit root test is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for all variables being stationary using the 
following auxiliary regression: 
p 
^y, = «o + + Z + + 
where y is the variable under consideration and T is a time variable. In estimating the regression, 
the lag length (p) on the lagged dependent variable was determined to ensure the residual 
whiteness. 
2. Sample period is Q2/1999-Q4/2006. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Table A.2.2 Inverse roots of characteristic polynomial 
Endogenous variables: Y, CPI, VND, FCD, RVND, RUSD 
Exogenous variables: Constant, EX. 
Lag specification 1 1 
Roots Modulus 
0.941037 -0.095346i 0.945855 
0.941037 + 0.095346i 0.945855 
0.655928 0.655928 
0.560678 0.560678 
0.392752 - 0.250204i 0.465678 
0.392752 + 0.250204i 0.465678 
No root lies outside the unit circle. 
VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
Table A.2.3 VAR residual serial correlation LM tests 
HO: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 30 
Lag LM Stat Probability 
1 37.23218 0.4121 
2 29.52328 0.7687 
3 39.51541 0.3158 
4 57.05572 0.1425 
5 32.13787 0.6529 
6 23.72079 0.9422 
Probabilities are from Chi-square with 36 degrees of freedom. 
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Figure A.2.1 Equation stability test (CUSUM test) 
Output Prices 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
VND monetary aggregate Foreign currency deposits 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
VND interest rate USD interest rate 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Note: The test for stability is CUSUM test (test of cumulative sum of recursive residuals). The dotted lines 
are 5 per cent significant lines. 
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Appendix A.3 Tests of model 3 
Table A.3.1 Inverse roots of characteristic polynomial 
Endogenous variables: Y, CPI, VND, FCD, RVND, RUSD 
Exogenous variables: Constant, EX. 
Lag specification 1 1 
Roots Modulus 
0.986636 0.986636 
0.819087 -0.475389i 0.947047 
0.819087 + 0.4753891 0.947047 
0.480567 0.480567 
-0.150591 0.150591 
0.147954 0.147954 
No root lies outside the unit circle. 
VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
Table A.3.2 VAR residual serial correlation LM tests 
HO: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 23 
Lag LM Stat Probability 
1 44.28451 0.1617 
2 48.13829 0.0850 
3 48.87473 0.0745 
4 38.14473 0.3721 
5 47.06137 0.1026 
6 35.37972 0.4979 
Probabilities are fi-om Chi-square with 36 degrees of freedom. 
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Table A.3.3 Diagnostic tests of each equation in the VAR system 
Diagnostic Test Y CPI VND FCD R V N D RUSD 
Normali ty of JB 7.12 0.023 0.40 0.73 0.62 6.69 
Errors 0.03 0.98 0.81 0.69 0.73 0.04 
Serial correlation of F 0.55 0.55 0.38 1.99 0,01 0.35 
errors 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.17 0.92 0.56 
LM 0.58 0.59 0.42 1.99 0.01 0.38 
0.44 0.44 0.51 0.15 0.91 0.53 
Heteroskedasticity F 1.86 0.74 0.69 1.13 0.46 1.38 
of errors 0.17 0.69 0.73 0.43 0.90 0.31 
LM 16.7 11.9 11.5 14.2 9.20 15.3 
0.21 0.53 0.56 035 0.75 0.28 
Functional form F 6.34 0.87 1.60 8.21 0.85 0.22 
(RESET) 0.06 0.36 0.22 003 0.37 0.64 
LL 9.71 1.39 2.50 9.65 1.35 0.35 
0.04 0.23 0.11 0.02 0.24 0.55 
Note : 
1. Sample period is Q1/2001-Q4/2006. 
2. Definitions of ail tests are as explained in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
Table A.3.4 Identifying test of non-recursive VAR model 
£y 1 
ECPI 0.0029 1 
Evnd = -0.467 -1.185 1 0.52 -0.054 
Efcd 0.648 -1.885 -0.077 1 0 -0.055 
ErVND 0 22.513 4.30 0 1 0 
Erusd 0 0 -3.80 2.80 0.515 1 
'ey 
ficpi 
fiVND 
epcD 
Crvnd 
Crusd 
Log likelihood = 283.47 LR test for over-identification: Chi-square (1) = 0.034 Probability = 0.854 
S o u r c e : Author ' s calculations. 
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Figure A.3.1 Equation stability test (CUSUM test) 
Output Prices 
03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 06Q1 06Q3 
VND monetary aggregate 
03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 06Q1 0603 
VND interest rate 
03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 0601 0603 
Foreign currency deposits 
03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 0503 06Q1 0603 
USD interest rate 
0303 0401 04Q3 05Q1 06Q3 0601 06Q3 0303 0401 0403 0501 0503 0601 0603 
Note: The test for stability is CUSUM test (test of cumulative sum of recursive residuals). The dotted lines 
are 5 per cent significant lines. 
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Appendix A.4 Tests of model 4 
Table A.4.1 Unit root test 
Test for 1(0) Test for 1(1) Critical value Critical value 
Variables (Levels) (First differences) at 1% level at 5% level 
1(0) 1(1) 1(0) 1(1) 
VNDLOAN -3.87 -7.51 -4.29 -4.31 -3.57 -3.57 
FCLOAN -1.64 -6.38 -4.31 -4.30 -3.57 -3.57 
RVNDLEND -3.78 -5.94 -4.30 -4.31 -3.56 -3.57 
RUSDLEND -0.24 -4.2 -4.29 -4.31 -3.56 -3.57 
Note: Definitions of ail tests are as explained as in Table A.2.1 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
Table A.4.2 Inverse roots of characteristic polynomial 
Endogenous variables: Y, CPI, RVND, RUSD, VNDLOAN, FCLOAN 
Exogenous variables: Constant, EX. 
Lag specification 1 2 
Roots Modulus 
0.937765 -0.132892i 0.947135 
0.937765 + 0.132892i 0.947135 
0.483027 - 0.602978i 0.772591 
0.483027 + 0.602978i 0.772591 
0.535278 - 0.089947i 0.542783 
0.535278 + 0.089947i 0.542783 
0.021733 -0.531793i 0.532236 
0.021733 +0.531793i 0.532236 
-0.474203 - 0.231579i 0.527729 
-0.474203 + 0.231579i 0.527729 
0.285377 - 0.047545i 0.289310 
0.285377 + 0.047545i 0.289310 
No root lies outside the unit circle. VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Table A.4.3 VAR residual serial correlation LM tests 
HO: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 29 
Lag LM Stat Probability 
1 34.47642 0.5411 
2 31.56844 0.6793 
3 28.88246 0.7943 
4 43.02360 0.1958 
5 46.58332 0.1113 
6 24.90899 0.9179 
Probabilities are from Chi-square with 36 degrees of freedom. 
Table A.4.4 Diagnostic tests of each equation in the VAR system 
Diagnostic Test Y CPI RVND RUSD VNDLOAN FCLOAN 
Normahty of JB 1.77 4.53 2.96 7.70 1.04 1.69 
Errors 0.41 0.11 0.23 0.02 0.59 0.43 
Serial correlation of F 1.10 0.13 0.02 0.35 0.19 0.10 
errors 0.30 0.72 0.89 056 0.66 0.75 
LM 1.13 0.14 0.02 0.37 0.20 0.11 
0.28 0.70 0.88 0.54 0.65 0.74 
Heteroskedasticity F 0.32 0.98 8.37 1.16 0.99 0.46 
of errors 0.95 0.59 0.05 0.52 0.59 0.88 
LM 21.1 25.8 28.5 26.3 25.8 23.05 
0.68 0.41 0.28 0.39 0.41 0.57 
Functional form F 0.54 0.37 1.90 0.75 0.64 4,87 
(RESET) 0.37 0.55 0.19 0.39 0.43 0.04 
LL 0.78 0.75 3.7 1.52 1.30 6.35 
0.37 0.38 0.06 0.21 0.25 0.02 
Note: 
1. Sample period is Q2/1999-Q4/2006. 
2. Definitions of tests are as explained in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
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Figure A.4.1 Equation stability test (CUSUM test) 
Output Prices 
03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 06Q1 06Q3 03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 06Q1 06Q3 
V N D interest rate USD interest rate 
03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 06Q1 06Q3 03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 06Q1 06Q3 
V N D loans Foreign currency loans 
03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 06Q1 06Q3 03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 06Q1 06Q3 
Note: The test for stability is C U S U M test (test of cumulative sum of recursive residuals). The dotted lines 
are 5 per cent significant lines. 
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Appendix A.5 Tests of model 5 
Table A.5.1 Diagnostic tests of each equation in the VAR system 
Diagnostic Test Y CPI RVNDLEND RUSDLEND VNDLOAN FCLOAN 
Normality of JB 0.17 0.35 0.62 0.74 0.11 1.13 
Errors 0.91 0.83 0.73 0.69 0.95 0.56 
Serial correlation F 1.89 1.33 0.98 0.45 4.57 4.11 
of errors 0.18 0.25 0.33 0.51 0.04 0.052 
LM 1.90 1.37 1.01 0.47 4.20 3.83 
0.17 0.24 0.31 0.49 0.04 0.05 
Heteroskedasticity F 1.04 2.26 1.54 1.01 8.70 6.27 
of errors 0.46 0.06 0.20 0.48 0.02 0.04 
LM 13.7 19.4 16.6 13.5 26.6 25.1 
0.39 0.11 0.21 0.41 0.014 0.02 
Functional form F 1.04 2.49 0.17 0.53 0.97 4.94 
(RESET) 0.32 0.13 0.68 0.47 0.33 0.04 
LL 1.45 3.36 0.24 0.74 1.35 6.34 
0.23 0.07 0.62 0.38 0.24 0.01 
Note: 
1. Sample period is Q2/1999-Q4/2006. 
2. Definitions of all tests are as explained in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
Source: Author 's calculations. 
154 
Table A.5.2 Inverse roots of characteristic polynomial 
Endogenous variables: Y, CPI, RVNDLEND, RUSDLEND, VNDLOAN, FCLOAN 
Exogenous variables: Constant, EX. 
Lag specification 1 1 
Roots Modulus 
0.939228 - 0.140650i 0.949701 
0.939228 + 0.140650i 0.949701 
0.888463 0.888463 
0.463915 0.463915 
0.297588 0.297588 
-0.236293 0.236293 
No root lies outside the unit circle. 
VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
Table A.5.3 VAR residual serial correlation LM tests 
HO: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 30 
Lag LM Stat Probability 
1 49.74618 0.0634 
2 39.76804 0.3059 
3 30.69250 0.7189 
4 47.69130 0.0920 
5 61.72799 0.0480 
6 41.36050 0.2481 
Probabilities are from Chi-square with 36 degrees of freedom. 
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Figure A.5.1 Equation stability test (CUSUM test) 
Output Prices 
2002 2003 ' 2004 ' 2006 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
VND lending interest rate USD lending interest rate 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
VND loans Foreign currency loans 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Note: The test for stability is CUSUM test (test of cumulative sum of recursive residuals). The dotted lines 
are 5 per cent significant lines. 
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